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INTRODUCTION
In March 1944, the African township of Orlando
near Johannesburg witnessed the first of a wave of squatter
movements which was to sweep across the Fitwatersran^
during the next three or four years. The movements were,
for the most part, a desperate response to the apparent
inability or reluctance of the authorities to tackle the
massive backlog in housing provision which had developed,
in the major industrial centres as African workers and their
families flooded in to meet the expandino labour demand
brought about by the wartime economic boom. Although
South Africa had already experienced phases of rapid urban-
ization during earlier periods (notably the First World
War), the magnitude of the problem which now confronted.the
state's housing apparatus was unprecedented and soon took
on the dimensions of a full-blown crisis as decisive action
to remedy the situation failed to materialize. By the
beginning of 1955, however, not quite eleven vears after
the squatters had first thrust themselves into the official
consciousness, an editorial in Bantu - the periodical pub-
lished by the Department of Native Affairs to disseminate
its 'viewpoint' amongst the African population - could
claim:
The solution of the Bantu housing problem has
now reached a stage which we can call the end of
the beginning. Improved houses are being completed
every day. During the next ten years hundreds of
thousands of Bantu will be properly housed for the
first time.2
This paper is an attempt to move towards an explanation
of how this 'solution' of the 'Bantu housing problem1 was
finally achieved and, more specifically, of how the founda-
tions of what we now know as Soweto came to be laid.
It focuses on the resolution of certain strategic issues
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linked to the provision of African housing and on the
establishment of the particular legislative and institutional
framework within which the concrete practices that were to
generate the form of the 'modern' township were brought
into play. In coming to terms with the mass of detailed
and often confusing empirical material on which the paper is
based, I have tried to avoid the danger of remaining trapped
at the level of merely descriptive narrative by explicitly
situating the evolution of African housing policy within the
political and economic context on which, I would argue, it
was always predicated.
In this respect, I have found what I consider to be a
useful point of entry into the labyrinth of 'facts' in
Manuel Castells' conceptualisation of 'urban planning1
as the theoretical field of state intervention in the 'urban1,
where the latter "refers not only to a snatial form, but
expresses the social organization of the processes of repro-
duction". More precisely, Castells defines 'urban planning'
as: .
the intervention of the political in the
specific articulation of the different instances
of a social formation within a collective unit
of reproduction of labour power, with the intention
of ensuring its extended reproduction, of regula-
ting the non-antagonistic contradictions that
have.arisen and of repressing the antagonistic
contradictions, thus assuring the interests of
the dominant social class in the whole of the
social formation and the organization of the
urban system, in such a way as to ensure the
structural reproduction of the dominant mode of
production.3
Despite the elaborate formalism of the theoretical
system in which it is embedded, Castells' definition seems
to provide effective purchase on the rather intuitive notion
that 'township policy1 - notwithstanding the more overtly
racist overtones of its ideological underpinnings - ultimate-
ly constitutes a class-bound political practice. Certainly,
it enables us to penetrate beneath a superficial acceptance
of the 'neutral', 'technical' status of bodies such as the
National Building Research Institute, which olaved a major
role both in the development of the township concept as such
(i.e. as an urban planning agency in the more restricted,
conventional sense), and in the development of the means
through which it could be given material form (i.e. as a
source of the necessary technology).
It should be emphasized, however, that the definition
has not been deployed here as a rigorous analytical tool,
but rather as a means of organizing a considerable volume of
otherwise largely incoherent material into a working structure
which will undoubtedly require revision as analysis proceeds.
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The length of the paper and the degree to which it has been
shaped by the need to come to terms with the 'facts' rather
than to present systematically developed arguments are,
I think, indicative of its status as a work in progress.
The paucity of existing work dealing with the same subject
matter and the lack of theoretical depth in the few accounts
which have been produced 4 must remain the ultimate justifi-
cation for the appearance of such a tentative and preliminary
study.
The body of the paper has been divided into four parts.
Part I deals with the politic.al.__.ajidL..ecanomJxu context from
which the African housing crisis emerged in the aftermath of
the Second World War. It locates the failure of the state
apparatus to move beyond a somewhat tenuous containment of
the squatter phenomenon in the inability of the United Party
government to establish a practical and broadlv-accepted
approach to the problem. Part II examines the evolution of
'Native policy' in the period before 1948 in terms of certain
issues which were to become the pivotal points of the Nation-
alist government's attempts to resolve the crisis during the
early 50s. It focuses on the changing responses to these
issues articulated in the reports of certain key official
commissions or committees of enquiry. Part III sketches
the parallel development during the late 40s and early 50s
of firstly, the legislative programme required by the Nation-
alist government to implement its increasinalv coherent but
controversial African housing policy and, secondly, the
'scientific' research programme co-ordinated by the NBRI
to provide the state with the technical means to translate
its policy into material reality. Part IV returns to an
account of developments in Johannesburg after 1948 in order
to illustrate how specific, local conditions affected the
implementation of the policy evolved at the national level
and attempts to map some of the parameters of the conflict
within the City Council, and between it and the central
government. A very brief conclusion points to some of the
more general theoretical implications of the preceding
analysis.
In 1939, on the brink of the Second VJorld War, the pro-
vision of housing to accommodate Johannesburg's African popula-
tion presented, according to the Manager of the city's Non-
European Affairs Department, "no great problem": oniy 143
families had registered on the official waiting list for
municipal accommodation.5 To a large extent, the 'constant
menace' of the inner city slums - those "plague spots in the
moral and social life o^ the community" 6 which had absorbed
a considerable proportion of the citv's civic energies over
the preceding four decades - had been overcome. Within the
city's borders, apart from the municipal 'locations', onlv
the Malay Location (the area now known as Pageview) and the
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strongholds of African resistance to further clearance schemes
lodged in Sophiatown and the adjacent areas of Martindale and
Newclare still contained substantial African populations. To
the north, just beyond the municipal boundary, Alexandra had
become an isolated 'black spot1 disturbing the more bucolicly-
inclined members of the white citizenry in their genteel
conquest of the countryside, but for the moment of secondary
concern to the City Council.
The gradually more efficient machinery of the Council's
slum clearance programme, boosted by the passage of the
Slums Act in 1934, had earlier resulted in an alarming in-
crease in the population of these areas as the residents
of 'declared' areas flooded in to avoid exile to the new
township or Orlando in the south west (with its attendant
increase in living costs) or simply to escape official detec-
tion . Progress in the provision of alternative accommoda-
tion in Orlando - the "future great citv of Bantudom" as it
had been hailed by the Bantu World on. its inauguration
as a 'model township' - had been steady if hardly spectacu-
lar. But the construction of some 5 90O houses accommodating
an estimated population of 35 0007 had taken effect and by
1937 the Council had been able to record with satisfaction
that 90 percent of the people evicted from the slum areas
were now moving to the locations, as compared with only 12
per cent three years before.8
The outbreak of war, however, had heralded a new phase
in South Africa's economic trajectory and the process of
urbanization with which it was articulated. The substantial
isolation of the economy brought about by the drastic reduc-
tion in the availability of imported commodities and metro-
politan technology and the expanded demands of the war effort
forced the development of an increasingly sophisticated and
diversified secondary industrial sector. Between 193 9 and
1945, the value of manufacturing output rose by 116 per cent
and the size of the industrial labour force increased by
53 per cent with only 19 000 of the additional 125 000 workers
being white. The growth of the armed forces to 300 000 men,
many of them skilled workers withdrawn from production, and
the expansion of economic activity created an acute labour
shortage and Africans in ever greater numbers began to move
into skilled and semi-skilled positions previously occupied
by whites.9
There was, however, a further dimension to the problems
which were being experienced by the urban African population.
With the expanded labour demands of the war-time economy, the
steady pre-war influx of predominantly male African workseekers
into the industrial centres had soon swelled to a flood,
encouraged at least in part, it seems, by the decision of the
Minister of Native Affairs in 1942 to 'relax' the enforcement
of the pass laws in the major urban areas.1° Between 1936
and 1948, the African population of Johannesburg more than
doubled - from roughly 229 000 to an estimated 506 500 -
and as the Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department
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(NEAD) noted in 1948: "During the past few years, there
has been a marked and increasing tendency for the Native
labourer coming to the City in search of employment to bring
his family with thim".11 By the end of 1943., the number
of families on the official waiting list for municipal accom-
modation had grown to 4 500, increasing by the end of 1947
to 16 000. An NEAD survey in 1946 estimated that the actual
demand for housing - that is, including those families not
on the waiting list - was of the order of 40 000 dwellings.12
The pressures to which the established racial division
of labour had been subjected during the war years and the
increased bargaining power of African workers had been
expressed in a dramatic upsurge of strike action. Between
1940 and 1945, non-whites' had struck for an average of
4,2 man-days and a total of 220 205 man-days, despite the
proclamation of War Measure No. 145 in December 1942 which
had outlawed strikes by Africans and imposed severe sanctions
for breaches of the provisions.13 Though without official
recognition and subject to considerable harrassment, African
membership of trade unions had mushroomed, giving the Council
of Non-European Trade Unions a total membership of 158 000
in 119 unions by the end of the war. The growth of militant
unionism had also been reflected in the spectacular increase
in the number of African workers subject to Wage Board deter-
minations during the year 1942/43, from 1 084 to 67 632, and
in. the 52 per cent rise in the 'real earnings' of Africans
in the private industrial sector between 1939/40 and 1945/46
(compared to a rise of 10 per cent between 1930/31 and 1939/
4O.1%
But there had inevitably been another side to the coin.
The inflationary pressures of an expanding economy and the
rising wage bill had resulted in a sharp increase in the
cost of living. Between 1939 and 1945, the retail price
index on all items had risen 35 per cent, and a study under-
taken as early as 1940 had indicated that the cost of certain
basic consumer goods (mealie meal, rice, paraffin, coal, etc)
had increased by between 20 and 50 per cent since before the
war.15 The official figures for the rate of African unemploy-
ment, on the other hand, had in 1942 fallen to well below the
pre-war level and had only risen to half of this level by
1944.16 For many members of the expanding urban proletariat,
it is likely that the problem of meeting the costs of their
reproduction was less that of securing employment than that
of the prevailing wage levels - despite the advances that
had been made by unionized and other workers in certain
sectors. The deteriorating conditions had been clearly
indicated in the 1942 report of the Smit Committee, which
compared the amount of £7.14s 6d that had been found to be
necessary "under existing conditions in Johannesburg to house,
feed and clothe a Native family of five in decency" with the
average monthly wage of £5 2s lid calculated from a sample
of 27 994 "unskilled workers in thirty-five industries,
including Municipal employees" in the same city.17
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The growing shortage of accommodation had been further
exacerbated when in 1943, the Council's building programme
had been forced to close down due to the shortages of both
building materials and trained artisans. To the housing stock
of 11 046 units distributed between the four municipal loca-
tions (Orlando, Pimville, Western Native Township and Eastern
Native Township) in 1940, only 750 new houses had been added
during 1941 and 1942; no new houses at all had been construc-
ted during 1943 and 1944. The Council had been forced to
rescind an earlier decision to permit only one family to
occupy each house in Orlando and from 1940 had allowed its
tenants to take in sub-tenants. It has been suggested
that, given the difference between the estimated and the
'official' population figures, there were also substantial
numbers of unregistered sub-tenants in the various locatinns18
The dam finally burst in J^ arch 1944, when James Mpanza,
a member of the Orlando Advisory Board and leader of the
Sofasonke ('we shall die together1) Party, assembled a group
of sub-tenants ("predominantly women", the Manager of the
NEAD reported) and some families from Newclare and Kliptown
to occupy the open ground along the Kl^pJ*iver_yalley near
the Orlando community hall. By early April, between 6 000
and 8 000 people had moved into the area, paying an entrance
fee of 2s 6d and a further weekly levy of the same amount
to the Sofansonke organisers for the right to erect a shelter
from whatever materials were to hand.19
Faced with what Alf Stadler describes as "virtually
a state- within a states^ ' - into which even the access of
the 'European officials' was controlled by the Sofasonke
Party, as the Manager of the NEAD complained - the City
Council appealed to the central government for assistance.
The government, however, proved unsympathetic and, faced
with the attitude that "nothing could be gained by chasing
a number of people from a place where they were settled
unless the authorities knew of a place to which they could
go", 2 ° the Council grudgingly^accepted responsibility for
the provision of alternative accommodation""and began to
construct rows of temporary one-room 'shelters' using concrete
'breeze-blocks,' . When the squatters' camp was finally cleared
late in 1945, more than 4 000 families had been accommodated
in the 'shelters'indicating that a total of at least 20 000
people had passed through it during its relatively short
existence. Mpanza had proved to be a tough and capable,
if somewhat unscrupulous leader and through the Sofasonke
Party had ruled the camp in a style with more than a touch
of the mafioso to it. The squatters, on the other hand, had
for their part emerged with at least one important gain:
official recognition of their need for housing and, since the
'shelters' were to be 'temporary', a committment on the part
of the.authorities to provide something more adequate.21
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However, in January 1946, when a second movement of
about a thousand families who were obviously inspired by
Mpanza's success started to occupy partially completed or
temporarily vacant houses in the location, the authorities
were less inclined to accept the situation passively. Con-
cerned that "the Native Leaders (had) merged the City's
housing deficiency with the general political and economic
disabilities (sic) of Natives" and that "squatting was pre-
sented to the Native people as a crusade to remove such
disabilities",22 they reacted forcefully. A court order to
remove Mpanza from Johannesburg (later successfully appealed)
was issued and a large contingent of South African Police
and municipal police was assembled to eject the squatters
from the houses they had occupied. After the eviction, the
attempt of a group of between two and three hundred families
to maintain some sort of presence in the area by erecting
makeshift shelters on some nearby vacant ground was harrassed
continuously by municipal location officials and finally a
skirmish occurred in which two people were killed.
Confronted with the arrival of yet another group of
people no longer prepared, despite the threat of official
violence, to live as sub-tenants under truly appalling condi-
tions in the old Pimville location, the Council again entered
into trilateral negotiations with the government and the new
group's leaders. By 'mutual agreement', a scheme was ini-
tiated to make serviced sites in the nearby Jabavu township
available for 'controlled squatting1 by members of the group
normally resident and employed in Johannesburg. Some 1 700
families were eventually permitted to erect temporary dwel-
lings but were charged a monthly site rental to cover the
cost of the communal water supply and bucket sewage disposal
service.23 To fulfil its obligations to the sub-tenants on
its waiting list, the Council proposed to continue building
breeze-block shelters into which families on the list would
move, leaving their sub-tenancies, vacant for Rnuatters from
the serviced site scheme. But, as might have been anticipated,
the squatters declined to participate in an arrangement which
would merely return them to the situation from which they had
just escaped and the proposal lapsed.
The squatter movement, however, persisted and began
to spread with camps appearing almost simultaneously in
Pimville and Alexandra, while various groups of more or less
adequately organised squatters continued to enter the Orlando
area. Within months, it had spread (or the existence of al-
ready established camps had been uncovered) throughout the Wit-
watersrand and adjacent areas and the Department of Native
Affairs was anxiously viewing the situation in terms, of "a
general state of dissatisfaction and unrest", while the
Chief Native Commissioner on the Rand was sufficiently agi-
tated to report, menacingly if somewhat obscurely, the exis-
tence of "squatting ... specially designed to embarrass the
authorities."z* But by now, Stadler suggests, in Johannes-
burg at least,
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... the Council was coming to realise that while
small movements were vulnerable, any well-organi-
sed movement could not be eliminated simply by
harrassing the leadership or by moving them out
of town particularlv as the central government
made it clear that the only acceptable immediate
solution was the development of 'controlled'
squatting camps, for which the resettlement of
Mpanza's camp in breeze-block rooms had provided
a precedent.2 5
In March 1947, the municipalitv established the Moroka Emer-
gency Camp on a site to the south of the Jabavu camp. It was
another serviced site scheme with entry once again restricted
to people who had been in employment in Johannesburg for six
months or more. The screening process excluded only about 4
per cent of those tested and the Fagan Commission later held
that even if allowance were made for evasion of the test,
it would "safely be said that over 90 per cent were able to
comply with the condition laid down". The municipality
"accepted responsibility" for some 11 000 families comprising
over 50 000 people under the conditions of the scheme. G
By September, the transfer to the emergency camp had been
completed and two months later a protracted rent strike, which
had started in Jabavu as early as Mav, finally forced the
council to reduce the exorbitant monthly site rental from
15s to 10s - which nevertheless remained high in comparison
with the 13s 4d rental charged for a serviced two-roomed
municipal house.27
For the moment, it seemed, the squatting movement in
Johannesburg could be contained by the judicious use of
'controlled squatting' to disperse the larger or more
cohesive groups and by the use of force against the smaller
and less organised groups. However, with the memory of the
Alexandra bus boycotts of 194 3 and 1944 - which had drama-
tically illustrated the ability of African communities
to organize around issues bearing on the level of their
standard of living28 - still fresh, and with the full magni-
tude of the 'squatter problem' beginning to reveal itself,
the mounting uneasiness in official circles was further
crystallized by attempts to give the "general state of dis-
satisfaction and unrest" amongst the African population a
specifically political focus.
. An anti-pass conference had been convened by the African
National Congress (ANC) in Johannesburg in May 1944 - largely
it seems, in response to efforts by the rival Communist Party
of South Africa (CPSA) to initiate a national campaign against
passes during the previous year. It had been followed by a
demonstration of some 20 000 people in the city centre and
although the subsequent attempt to collect a million signa-
tures for the anti-pass petition had failed, the arrest of
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one of the organizers - a mission school teacher from
Brakpan - had provoked a school boycott and a well-supported
stay-away by the inhabitants of the town's location. A
second anti-pass conference organized by the ANC in Johannes-
burg in June 1946 had resolved "to commence a mass struggle
within three months of this date, which mass struggle will
culminate in the national stoppage of work and the burning
of passes".29 In fact it was to be some years before the
shift away from the pattern of constitutional protest lecl
by a small and compromised petty bourgeoisie towards a pro-
gramme of direct mass action and passive resistance would
mature under the leadership of a revitalized ANC in the
Defiance Campaign. Nevertheless, with the adjournment
of the Native Representative Council (NRC)sine die in the
wake of the brutal suppression of the 1946 African mine-
workers' strike, it was already apparent that the militant
tendency in African political opposition to the state was
gathering momentum.3'
The worsening of the political situation elicited
two rather different responses from the United Party govern-
ment. On the one hand, it led to the persona], intervention
of Smuts in a belated and largely unsuccessful effort to
secure some sort of rapprochement with the disaffected
leadership of the NRC. On the other hand, it undoubtedly
influenced the government's decision to appoint the Native
Laws Commission under the chairmanship of H.A. Fagan (a
former Minister of Native Affairs) to investigate a far-
reaching reformulation of 'Native policy'. The emerging
' squatter problem' , however* de^manded^a
 =ima_ter_ial, 'economic '
intervention by the sta_te._which was to prove rather more
difficult to deliver. In 1946, when the implications of the
influx to the towns had become impossible to ignore, the
state's attempts to bring it under control had necessitated
the invocation of wartime emergency powers to restrict the
rights of Africans to travel by train to the major industrial
centres. 31 But in the face of the continued antipathy of
many local authorities towards its proposals and certain
other problems, the central government remained apparently
unable to act decisively to end the escalating housing crisis
which confronted it in the post-war period.
In 1944, the Housing Amendment Act had replaced the
Central Hqusj-nj^  Board., established under the original Housing
Act of 1920, with the National Housing and Planning Commission
(NHPC)- a body with far wider powers enabling it to undertake
its own housing schemes as well as financing local authority
schemes from a national housing loans fund set up to comple-
ment the existing provincial loans funds. The state's capa-
city to tackle its proposed post-war housing programme had
been further enhanced with the passage of the_ Housing (Emer-
gency Powers) Act^in. 1_9_4_5, which enabled "tlie~G6vern6r-
General._to make by proclamation emergency ^ regulat ion s_ cover ing
a wide range of^matters pertinent to the programme. Under
the Provisions of the Act - which were eventually extended to
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1957 - regulations were proclaimed which broadened the
powers of the NHPC to undertake the provision of housing
and which covered the granting of State lands and the exprop-
riation of the other lands for such schemes, as well as the
training of building workers and the setting up of certain
controls over building materials.32
In addition, in an attempt to stimulate local authority
housing programmes and after protracted negotiations with
the United Municipal Executive (UME), the newly appointed
NHPC_ had in December 1944 amended the existing 'sub-economic'
subsidy system which, the municipal representatives claimed,
had resulted in major losses to the local authorities. Under
the National Housing Scheme, the interest rate carried by
sub-economic housing loans increased from 3/4 per cent to
3$ per cent (the rate at which funds were allocated by the
Treasury to the Commission) but the government undertook
to share responsibility with the local authorities for any
losses incurred under the scheme in a ratio which could
vary between 2:1 and 3:1. The local authorities were further
to be permitted to include as charges against the cost of
sub-economic schemes expenditure on repairs and maintenance
an.d on various infrastructural and social services.33
But, despite what was described as J^the very favourable
National Housing formula"" in an official document reviewing
progress under_ the new arrangement;<=in 194 7, ..the shortage
of houses continued to grow. The state's economic and sub-
economic housing programmes for all racial groups had been
adversely affected by developments during and after the
war, and clearly the massive increases in the African popu-
lations of the major urban centres had completely overwhelmed
the conventional delivery system. The official document
ascribed the state's "inadequate contribution" to:
(a) the prevailing high building costs;
(b) the shortage of skilled building artisans;
(c) the acute shortage of building materials,
particularly cement and steel; and
(d) the unwillingness of local authorities to
face the losses involved (in certain cases
with justification.3 h
Apparently accepting its inability to affect this
situation, however, the Directorate of Housing (the 'tech-
nical' aim of the NHPC) proposed in 194 7 to supplement the
National Housing Scheme with an 'Emergency Native Housing
Scheme1 which would allow local authorities to erect tem-
porary dwellings, with an estimated life of ten years,
"using local materials and labour" on sites provided with
services of a "permanent nature". But in the following
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year, it was reported that although "interest in these
facilities" had been "encouraging in the initial stages" ,
only a single application for a loan to build some experi-
mental temporary houses had been received and "as a result
of this the scheme (had) virtually lapsed".35 This setback,
and the continuing reluctance of many local authorities to
undertake sub-economic schemes on the basis of the National
Housing formula induced Dr. Gluckman (then Minister of
Health, to whom the NHPC were responsible) early in 1948
to propose yet another scheme "to supplement the efforts
of local authorities in the field of Native housina". The
'State Housing Scheme1 would enable the NHPC to "carry out
sub-economic schemes for Natives in the municipal areas
of local authorities which so desired and would be prepared
to take over the completed schemes from-the Commission for
administrative purposes". The new scheme, however, was to
prove even more short-lived than its predecessor for, with
the change of government a few months later, the incoming
Minister "instructed the Commission to suspend further
action in this connection until such time as further con-
sideration could be given to the matter".36
In the event, Gluckman's proposal was to receive no
further consideration at all and the inability of the
NHPC under the United Party government to come to terms
with the problem of formulating a workable policy was to
become the object of much pointed comment in Parliament
by members of the new government.37 The problem, on the
other hand, could not be quite so simply disposed of, for
it had by now assumed staggering proportions. A survey
conducted by the Department of Native Affairs for the Direc-
torate of Housing in 1947 had indicated that the country's
-immediate requirements in African housing were 154 000
family dwellings plus single accommodation (in hostels, etc.)
for 106 900 people.38 In Johannesburg alone, the shortage
of houses for 'non-Europeans' had been estimated in 1947
to be 40 000 units, but by mid-1948 the city's Non-European
Affairs Department was suggesting that some 62 000 houses
would be needed to meet the demand over the next five years!9
The nature and the dimensions of the problem had therefore
been clearly revealed and although the new Nationalist govern'
ment was - for the time being- to remain unfettered by the
factionalism which had hamstrung its predecessors in the
post-war period, it would require a sustained and systematic
attack carried out over the next six years along a broad
ideological and political front to arrive at some sort of
'resolution'.
II
In order to grasp the complexity of the political and
ideological task confronting the Nationalist government in
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1948, we must retrace certain steps in the evolution of
•Native policy' prior to that date, which bear on the
question of how the African population of the urban areas
was to be accommodated. To achieve a really comprehensive
understanding, we would probably have to go back at least
as far as an examination of the matrix of social forces
reflected in the passage of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in
192 3, and possibly beyond that , to look at what underlay
the various administrative and legislative measures which
provided the rationale for the first move towards urban
segregation during the first two decades of the century.1*0
Such an undertaking would, however, require more space than
is available here and the investigation will be confined to
certain specific issues running through the reports of three
Commissions or Committees which, more or less systematically,
posed the 'accommodation' question between 1935 and 1948.
The significance of the Departmental Committee appointed
in 1935 "to enquire into and report upon the question of
residence of Natives in urban areas and certain proposed
amendments to the Native Urban Areas Act No. 21 of 1923" " -1
lies primarily in the precision with which its report iden-
tifies the main parameters of the struggles that were to
develop around the 'Native housing problem' during the late
40s and early 50s. In particular, the Committee isolated
the three issues that would dominate all official or quasi-
official thinking on the matter: the need for a 'permanent'
or 'stabilised' urban African labour force, the distribution
of the costs of accommodating this labour force, and the role
that African building workers could play in providing cheaper
accommodation for it. The Committee's terms of reference
required it "to recommend the form which legislation should
take ":
1. to enforce the principle of limiting the
number of Natives in urban areas to the
labour requirements of. those areas;
2. to provide for controlling the entry of
Natives into urban areas; and
3. to provide for the withdrawal of super-
fluous Natives from urban areas.1*2
The Committee had been appointed in response to "the
pressures for tightening up the law in this regard" which
would eventually result in the passage of the Native Laws
Amendment Act in 1937. As the Fagan Report was to note
some thirteen years later, its two members - J. Mould Young
(subsequently a member of the Native Affairs Commission) and
A.L. Barrett (subsequently a member of both the Smit Committee
and the Fagan Commission) - "considered themselves bound by
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their mandate to draft amendments (to the Urban Areas Act
of 1923) designed to give municipalities and the Government
greater powers to restrict all entry of Natives into urban
areas"."3 Nevertheless, they had little taste for what they
perceived to be the Stallardist ideas underlying their terms
of reference k ** and devoted the body of their report to a
systematic refutation of those ideas. They Hounr' themselves,
for instance, "in full agreement" with the view of tbe Native
Economic Commission of 1932 that:
In the interest of the efficiency of urban indus-
tries it is better to have a fixed urban Native
population to the extent to which such population
is necessary than the present casual drifting pop-
ulation. It is therefore better in the national
interest to organize the urban areas in such a
manner as to give the most satisfactory results.
To continue employing Natives in urban areas, but
to treat them as if they should not be there,
is both illogical and short-sighted.45
And they were "in general agreement" with the "evidence"
of the Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives
that:
the economic interests of the country will
be served best by encouraging a stabilised urban
Native population in preference to a large army
of periodical workers, since
i. it will lead to greater efficiency;
ii. by encouraging a rise in wages, it will, not
only obviate the present danger to White stan-
dards of a low Native wage level, but will
increase that consuming power of the hstme
market on which the future of the country •
largely depends.4 6
They disagreed - "profoundly" - with "the view that it
would be sound policy to create a situation in which the
great majority of the Natives in the towns would be male
labourers, cut off from family life and without any sort
of security of tenure".1*7
With regard to the financial burden borne by the local
authorities in the provision of housing, the Committee
noted that while the use of white labour rather than "suf-
ficiently competent Native labour" had raised the cost of
African housing unnecessarily,
The root of the matter is in the inadequate
wage paid to Natives which renders them incapable of
paying a fair rent for hygienic quarters, and this
in turn involves the local authority in loss
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That is to say that the employer is free
to engage a cheap Native servant, whereupon the
Municipality must subsidise the transaction by
providing sub-economic accommodation.. Very many
of the difficulties in the way of the successful
management of urban locations would be solved if
the emplover could be made responsible for the
rent."8
And finally, in the face of African opposition to
Hertzog's Native Bills mounted largely through the
petty bourgeois All-African Convention, of which both
members of the Committee would have been keenly aware,
they warned that it would be "desirable'to administer
with a minimum of irritation to the better educated,
a system of restrictions rendered necessary by the
preponderating numbers of unattached and uncivilised
Natives." "9
The Young Committee, without transgressing the limits
of its political context in a racially exclusive democracy,
had in essence presented a proposal for a radical restruc-
turing of 'Native policy' to accommodate the changing labour
demands of an economy which was then undergoing a phase of
accelerated development in the secondary industrial sector.50
In 1942, when an Inter-departmental Committee was set up
under the chairmanship of D.L. Smit {the Secretary for Native
Affairs) "to explore possible ways, other than by merely
raising wages, of improving the economic, social and health
conditions of Natives in urban areas", 51 the need for a
'permanently' urbanized African labour force was clearly
no longer regarded as a matter for debate. The focus of
official attention had already shifted to the problem of how
the conditions of reproduction of such a labour force were
to be secured under the pressures of the wartime economy- and
can be seen to be part of a more general concern with what
Martin Legassick has identified as "the planned development
of the economy, and in particular .... the development of
a competitive secondary industrial sector". He argues
that :
envisaging the replacement of gold-
mining by secondary industry as the principal
motor of the economy, the state intended to
involve itself in a more coherent way: 'The
best economic system is one based on free
enterprise but subject to such collective
action as may be in the social interest.'52
The principle on which Legassick suggests state inter-
vention in the economy was to be based is taken from the
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1941 Third (Interim) Report of the Agricultural and
Industrial Requirements Commission, chaired by H.J. van Eck,
a leading industrialist.53 It is evident that such ideas
were then gaining currency and even becoming dominant within
certain branches of the state apparatus. In particular, they
seem to have permeated, and indeed to have constituted the
fundamental premise of the series of reports issued between
194 3 and 1948 by the Social and Economic Planning Council
(SEPC), itself perhaps the acme of J.H. Hofmeyr's period
of tenure as the reformist caretaker of domestic affairs
during Smuts' wartime absences.54
However, whether the conclusions of the van Eck Com-
mission directly influenced the members of the Smit Com-
mittee or not, the idea of direct state intervention to
effect the reproduction of the African labour force is
clearly present throughout their report. In examining the
relationship between wages and the poverty datum level,
the Committee argued that :
It would of course, be a mistake to think that
wages in general can be raised to a point higher
than the productive value of the labour they repre-
sent ... The money must come from somewhere; and
unless profits are already considerable, there are
only three ways in which it can be found: e ither
(1) there must be increased productiveness, in-
cluding better organisation and the elimination of
waste, or (2) there must be a scaling down of
skilled wages, or (3) the ratio of unskilled to
skilled workers must be increased. As our indus-
tries are already subsidised to enable them to
compete with world prices, it is clear that the
price of products cannot be raised.55
The second of these methods - that of "scaling down" skilled
wages - was discounted by the Committee on the grounds that
it would encounter strong resistance from the (largely
white) skilled workers and that, in any case, the effect
would be "infinitesimal" in most of the "repetitious indus-
tries" with a high proportion of unskilled to skilled workers
The third method - increasing the rates of unskilled to
skilled workers - was considered to be problematic because,
according to "an authoritative source", there, was "no fixed
ratio regulating the number of unskilled to the various
grades of semi-skilled and skilled classes" and when minimum
wages had been laid down for unskilled labour, "the initial
effect of raising the wages of the class (had) been to bring
about a reduction in the number employed, through better
organisation and the introduction of machinery wherever
possible". This left the first method - increasing produc-
tivity - which, the Committee thought, did "not appear to be
beyond the limits of practicability." 56
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The inference to be drawn from such a position is
that, if the general 'economic' wage of an 'unskilled'
labour force is insufficient to meet the costs of its
reproduction, then the only way in which the cycle low
wages - low productivity - low wages can be broken is for
the state to intervene either to supplement real wages
through 'social consumption' expenditures (on the components
of the 'indirect' or 'social wage1: subsidized housing and
transport, social security benefits, etc.), or to increase
the productivity of labour through 'social investment' ex-
penditures (on education and health care facilities, tech-
nical training schemes, etc.). 57 In its report, the
Committee did not explicitly identify the link between the
policy of 'state interventionism1 it had clearly espoused
and the unequivocal rejection of the possibility of direct
regulation of the wage relation in its terms of reference.
The consequences, however, are evident in almost every one
of its major recommendations.58
With regard specifically to housing, and in keeping
with the general thrust of its report, the Committee declined
to take up the lead offered by the Young Report on the respon-
sibility of employers in the provision of accommodation for
their African workers:
The real problem of rehousing of Natives is fundamen-
tally an economic one, and as long as an economic
wage is not being paid to them, it is necessary for
the housing of this class to be subsidized.59
Liability for the costs incurred in providing sub-economic
housing was therefore to remain within the state apparatus,
although some redistribution of the financial burden from
the local authorities to the central government was envisa-
ged. To reduce the rentals payable on such housing to a
figure compatible with the "low wages" received by African
workers, the Committee further recommended the establishment
of a "research branch", to be attached to the Central Housing
Board "for the purpose of investigating methods of construc-
tion and the use of materials which will lead to greater
economy in supplying Native housing" 60 - a suggestion which
would eventually bear fruit in 1946 with the inauguration
of the National Building Research Institute's 'Native housing'
research programme.
By 1946, however, as we have already seen, the question
of the 'permanence' of the African urban population had once
more become the central issue in the formulation of 'Native
policy'. The Native Laws Commission, appointed in August of
that year "to enquire into the operation of the laws in force
in the Union relating to Natives in or near urban areas;, the
Native pass laws; and the employment in mines and other ind-
ustries of migratory labour", was to be only tangentially
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interested in the question of housing policy as such.
Its overarching concern, clearly manifested in the report
released in 1948, was to establish a rationale for the
proposed policy of "facilitating and encouraging the stabil-
ization of (African) labour": a policy which, outside of
the mining industry, was intended to promote the develop-
ment of a permanently urbanized African labour force. 6l
Furthermore, the Commission implicitly endorsed the reser-
vations of the Young Committee concerning "the principle
of limiting the number of Natives in urban areas to the
labour requirements of those areas"62 and declared the "idea
of total segregation" to be"utterly impracticable" :
The townward movement of Natives is simplv an
economic phenomenon.... It can be guided and
regulated, but it is impossible to prevent it
or turn it in the opposite direction
We, therefore, have to accept that there is a
permanent urban Native population.G 3
In relation to the Young Committee's linking of the
"efficiency of urban industries" to the need for employers
to bear at least some of the costs of accommodating the
'stabilized' labour force, on the other hand, the Commission
was less enthusiastic. It suggested that:
Theoretically there may be much to say for
the contention that the costs (of accommodation)
should be recoverable from the employers. If
a workable scheme in this direction could be
put into operation - e.g. by making the employer
liable for the rental, or for a contribution to-
wards the rental of the house occupied by his
employee and leaving it up to the two of them to
make such arrangements about it as they oan
. agree on between themselves - we should in
principle see no objection ... This, however,
is a relatively minor matter upon which we have
formed no strong opinion. (emphasis added)
And concluded (in italics):
We doubt whether any wholly satisfactory solu-
tion will be found until the need for such
economic adjustments disappears and the labour-
ers by their own productive capacity attain a
position in which they can make their own
arrangements on an economic, not a sub-economic
basis.6*
On this point at least, it seems , the Commission was
holding firmly, and even agressively to the idea of the
'freely' established wage contract between capital and labour
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which had underlain the Smit Committee's terms of reference.
Moreover, the Commission's attitude manifestly represented
a retreat from the sort of social engineering advocated by
the SEPC. The latter, in a report published in 1946, had
declared that:
The Council cannot feel that this
scheme (the NHPC's "very favourable"
National Housing formula) is altogether
satisfactory, in that it is based entirely
on capital costs of projects and is not
related in any way to family income or
to family size. The Council believes that
a rental formula which is related to both
family size and family income should become
mandatory. It appears equitable that
such subsidy to the very poor and to large
families, since it is the result of national
poverty rather than a local responsibility,
should be paid by the Central Government.
For the Fagan Commission, however, while it had tacitly
accepted that the costs of subsidized African housing would
continue to be shared between the local authorities and the
central government, the idea that the financial burden on
the latter should be further increased by the sort of quasi-
Fabian proposal put forward by the SEPC was obviously unpala-
table. The conflation of the need to secure a more efficient
configuration of the relations of social reproduction with
the need to secure 'social justice' had not yet been accepted
on the agenda proposed by the ruling class.
To the extent that it considered the problem of actually
accommodating the 'stabilized' labour force it had advocated
at all, the general approach of the Fagan Commission was that
it should as far as possible be placed on an 'economic' basis
Hence the recommendation to use African labour "in the
building of houses for their own occupation" and the suggest-
ion that the adoption of the 'Bloemfontein system' - a
scheme in which Africans were allowed to build their own
houses on serviced sites under municipal supervision, using
materials supplied at cost price by the local authoritv -
and the granting of a "permanent stake in the place" based
on property ownership would facilitate the development of
'Native villages'.66 A further recommendation, that "the
government should ...be prepared to assume both the financial
and the administrative responsibility" for "Native villages
outside municipal jurisdiction", was apparently intended
largely to facilitate control of the mushrooming growth of
'peri-urban' squatter settlements.6 7
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Set against the dimensions of the problem that had already
been revealed, it could hardly be thought to provide the
coherent overall policy framework within which the NHPC
might move more decisively to resolve the housing crisis.
In any event, with the change of government and a complete
recasting of the fundamental premises of 'Native policy1
imminent, the question was about to become merely academic.
Ill
In the period following its hard-won electoral victory
in 1948, Malan's Re-united National Pary began a systematic
reorganization of the state apparatus in order to carry out
the apartheid programme it had presented to its white elec-
torate. On what had been identified as the "colour question",
the major parameters of Nationalist policy had been outlined
in the report of a Party committee under the chairmanship of
P.O. Sauer released during 1947.6e With regard to certain
aspects of a number of important issues - the desirability
of residential segregation and separate administrative
systems for Africans in the urban areas, the need for centra-
lized rather than local control of African movement through
a system of labour bureaus, industrial decentralization and
the development of the Reserves - the 'Native policy' pro-
posed in the Sauer Report was in substantial agreement with
the policy recommendations of the Fagan Commission. On the
absolutely central question of the permanent presence of
Africans in the urban areas, however, the conclusions reached
in the respective reports were diametrically opposed.69
The Sauer Committee had forcefully affirmed its commitment
to the Stallard doctrine:
The (number of) detribalized natives in the
towns must be frozen and preference as far
as work and other rights will be given to them
in the cities as long as they are there and
until such time as the ideal of total apartheid
is achieved ... The native in the white urban
areas should be regarded as a "visitor" who has
come to offer his services to his own advantage
and that of the white man.70
But as the Committee was at pains to make clear, the
"ideal of total apartheid" could not be achieved with the
stroke of a pen. The report was careful to maintain the
distinction between 'tribal' and 'detribalized natives'
and to note that:
The ideal which should be aimed at is the
gradual elimination of natives from industries
in white areas but it is realised that it will
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only be achiever* after many years
A quota system relating to the ratio of
white to black workers in industry will,
where desirable and practically possible^
be applied 1
The inference seems clear: while the ideologues of
apartheid obviously could not concede the contention of
the Fagan Commission that "the idea of total segregation
is utterly impracticable" because "the townward movement of
Natives is simply an economic phenomenon" which, while
11
 it can be guided or regulated, ... is impossible to pre-
vent .. or to turn ... in the opposite direction", they
remained - in the last analysis - subject to the reality of
the changing structure of economic relations. " For many
years", therefore, it would be necessary to accommodate the
presence of 'detribalized1 Africans in the 'white1 urban
areas and to cope with the massive housing backlog which
recent events had dramatically thrust into 'public' view.
Housing policy was neyertheless.to^.be^^gui^ed^by, certain,
principles while reflected^ J:iie...u_It4jriai;a. ah^afive~Qf-.total
apartheJ-Aj—
... as long as such ('detribalized1)
natives remain in urban areas, cognizance
must be taken of the different ethnic groups
(volksgroepe) and separate residential areas
must be provided for them where, under the
supervision of the relevant local authorities,
they will have their own social and welfare
services and will be able to choose their own
councils. It must be clear, however, that
their presence in the white urban areas will
be considered as temporary and that they will
never be able to lay claim to political rights
of any kind equal to those of the whites and
that they will never be able to own real estate
(vaste eiendomme). 7z
Through the prism of this single-minded determination
to enforce apartheid, however, the Nationalists appear to
have perceived the double-edged nature of the 'urban Native
question' with a great deal more clarity than had the policy-
makers of.the United Party government and their response was
to be structured accordingly. On the one hand, it was a matter
of immediate concern to choke off the "immense and unbalanced
increase" in the African urban population. On the other hand,
the principle of residential segregation was to be enforced
and the still untidy racial patterns of many of the major
urban areas brought to order. Given the 'legitimate' pre-
sence of a substantial proportion of the large numbers of
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Africans involved, this would require a housing policy
considerably more effective than that which had been inher-
ited from the previous government. For, as Legassick has
argued "The Nationalist government could not, any more than
its predecessor, ignore the structural crisis which required
the state to involve itself more directly in the reproduction
of labour-power" 73 - but neither could it afford to ignore
the political obligations imposed on it by the ideological
doctrine on which it had based its election manifesto.
In relation to its first and more obviously contentious
objective of stopping, and if possible reversing the flow of
Africans to the towns, the new government was obliged to
move initially with some caution. Although a general tight-
ening up of the administration of the existing influx con-
trol system produced some immediate results - the Johannes-
burg Municipality, for instance, refused entry to 14 587
Africans between 1 July 1948 and 31 June 1949 and endorsed
out a further 10 439 who were unable to find work 74 -
it was to be 1949 before the first legislative measures were
taken. The Native Laws Amendment Act of that year amended
the procedure for establishing labour bureaus originally
set down under the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911:
the functions of the bureaus were now to include the regis-
tration of unemployed Africans, the placing of work seekers
in jobs and controlling the movement of African labour into
the 'prescribed' areas. Opposition within the Assembly and
the rising tide of protest from commercial and industrial
interests against the trend of "continuing Governmental
interference in the economy" ha^ induced the government to
delete a clause compelling Africans to accept employment
offered through the bureaus.75
In November 1949, the Governor-General issued a pro-
clamation at the request of twentv-one local authorities
(including the Johannesburg Municipality), which closed the
urban areas concerned to the entry of Africans except for
mine employees, temporary visitors, and those whom the local
authority was prepared to allow in to take up employment for
which they had already been engaged or to seek work. Early
in 1950 the regulations governing influx control and the
registration of service contracts were extended by proclama-
tion to 95 urban areas - all the cities except Port Eliza-
beth and almost all the towns. In addition, successive
amendments to the regulations under which certificates
exempting certain Africans from the provisions of the pass
laws progressively raised the required qualifications.76
All these measures undoubtedly made it increasingly
difficult for Africans entering the urban areas for the
first time to establish a permanent presence there, but the
real cornerstone of the Nationalist legislative programme
was only to be laid with the passage of the Native Laws
Amendment Act of 1952. The key amendments were the introduc-
tion of the notorious '72 hour' clause into Section 10 of the
A Place to Live 22
Urban Areas Act and the automatic extension of its pro-
visions to all urban areas.77 Further provisions made
the registration of incoming work seekers with the labour
bureaus compulsory and increased the powers of magistrates
and Native Commissioners to deal with the expulsion of 'idle
and undesirable1 Africans from the urban areas. 78 The
Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents)
Act, passed during the same session was a further important
step towards bringing the entire African population under
a unified system of control. Far from abolishing passes,
it was actually intended to enable the state to extend the
controls over influx and urban residence to all Africans
by issuing 'reference books' to everyone over the age of
16, including women and those who had previously been
exempted through possession of the relevant qualifications.79
Despite these measures, Africans continued to enter
the urban areas both legally and illegally and in Johannes-
burg, for example, the NEAD estimates of the total African
population within the municipal area (e.g. including mine-
workers and people accommodated in municipal hostels and
on private premises) showed an increase from some 4 55 000
in June 1948 to about 516 600 by June 1953.ao Hence the
claim made by the Minister of Native Affairs in the Senate
in February 1954, that an estimated 100 000 Africans who
would otherwise have been in the urban areas had been
denied entry, 81 must be measured against the very real
pressures on the Nationalist government to be seen to be
living up to the pledges of its electoral platform: labour
bureau statistics did not distinguish between initial and
repeated attempts to gain entry to the urban areas and would
therefore tend to inflate this sort of figure. The fears
expressed by representatives of industrial and commercial
capital at a meeting with the Minister early in 1951 -
that the government would be unable to reconcile its inter-
vention in the 'natural' economic processes of African urbani-
zation with the legitimate demands of the urban economy for
African labour - nevertheless retained their currency. Al-
though Verwoerd had "clarified the position" by suggesting
that under apartheid influx control would not cut off the
supplies of labour but would merely prevent the uninhibited
growth of the African urban population,which could become
a political threat, many industrialists remained unconvinced
and continued to voice their opposition to government 'inter-
ference1. It would only be in 1956 that a nationwide survey
conducted by the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) amongst
its member organizations to determine the extent of their
labour shortages would reveal the general absence of such
shortages and thus finally allay this particular fear.82
Throughout the period under review, therefore, concern within
the 'business community' that the Nationalist government was
intent on hindering the free play of market forces would
continue to be a negative factor of some importance in the
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relationship between state and capital.
The second objective of Nationalist 'urban Native
policy1 initially presented a much less fundamental
challenge to the received wisdom of South African capitalists
and the 'liberal' establishment than had the issue of influx
control. Indeed, the general concept of residential and
administrative segregation within the urban areas was in no
essential way incompatible with the assumptions underlying
the conclusions of the Fagan Commission. The latter, while
disputing the premises of the Stallardist principle that
Africans should be excluded from permanent residence in the
'white' urban areas because granting them the municipal
franchise would constitute 'undesirable commingling' of
the races, had nevertheless asserted that" ... there are
differences between the races to which legislation has to
pay due regard and which make a measure of separation in
administrative affairs both necessary and desirable.".83
Nor, other than a passing reference to the "distasteful
connotations" of the word 'location' and a suggestion that
it be replaced with the term 'native village1, 8 ** had the
reoort anywhere questioned the established practice of resi-
dential segregation or the tenor of the provisions pertaining
to it under the existing legislation. As long as 'adequate'
accommodation was provided for any Africans displaced by
segregation measures and as long as their removal did not
result in any wage claims to meet increased transport and
accommodation costs, or any rises in the municipal rates
assessment to balance losses on the local Native Revenue
Account, the idea remained essentially uncontroversial -
for the white population at least. It would only be when the
implications of the National Party's pre-election commit"
ment to the use of "forceful and determined methods" to
"maintain the white character of our towns" became unmista-
kably clear in the application of the Group Areas legislation
during the fifties that a serious effort would be made by
white liberals to hinder the development of this ultimately
logical extension of the original concept.
The more pressing problem confronting the policy-makers
of the new government in 1948, however, was not the impure
character of 'their' towns but the very real danger that the
masses of a homeless people concentrated in the major urban
areas might again resort to autonomous action to secure
the shelter essential to their physical reproduction. Of the
three issues which had been identified in earlier official
thinking as bearing on the problem of accommodating Africans
in urban areas, the status of one - the need for a 'permanent'
urban African labour force - as a question still open to
debate had now been categorically denied as a matter of
fundamental principle in the apartheid programme. But the
other two issues - concerning the distribution of__the costs
ilf_J?.Qllgi.P.g'.U'b.f* - 1 ahfMir. .'fflrcp-tJaat- would nevertheless still be
re.quirecj and the use of African building workers to reduce
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the_se__ costs - remained central to the formulation of a
coherent overall policy framework within which the state's
housing agencies might successfully tackle the massive shor-
tage of accommodation. Both were to become the objects of
extended and often fierce debate outside, as well as within
Parliament during the next four years.
Almost immediately it assumed office, the Nationalist
government was faced with the task of trying to reconcile
a broadly-based demand for the use of skilled African labour
to cheapen the production cost of African housing - emanating
from bodies such as the Institute of Race Relations, the
Federation of Building Trade Employers and other employer
organizations - with the continued intransigence towards
such proporals of the white building workers' unions- In
September 1946 their predecessors in Smuts' cabinet had
decided to extend the Central Organization of Technical
Training (COTT) scheme, which had been set up to provide
technical training of ex-servicemen in an effort to alleviate
the shortage of skilled labour, to the training of African
building artisans. Not unexpectedly, perhaps, the (white)
Building Workers Industrial Union had perceived the proposal
to employ the cheaper labour power of Africans on work which
was conventionally defined as 'skilled' as an attempt to
drive a wedge into what was then known as the 'job colour
bar' - even though it had been indicated that the Africans
would only be permitted to work in 'Native areas' on the
construction of 'Native housing1.85 The arrival of the
first batch of African trainees at the Milner Park training
centre had drawn a strong warning from the Union that their
presence there would unleash a major country-wide strike..
The threatened strike action had been avoided and the confron-
tation ended with the government's decision to discontinue
the 'experiment' after the first African intake had completed
the course.86 Towards the end of 194 7, however, a long-
standing dispute with the employers' association on the Rand
had sparked off a white building workers' strike which, alth-
ough it had remained confined largely to the Johannesburg
and Pretoria areas, had lasted almost nine weeks and had
severely affected progress in the already hopelessly inade-
quate housing programme.8 7
While the strike had had no immediately apparent con-
nection with the incident of the previous year, it had
clearly revealed the disruptive power of the white working
class in a key sector of the economy and the lesson had
not been, lost on those responsible for the formulation of
the Nationalists' labour policy. One of the first acts
of the new Minister of labour when he assumed office less
than a year later was to announce that all training of Afric-
an building workers would be stopped. Informed by the
Department of Education - under which the training schemes
then in existence fell - that he had exceeded his authority,
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the Minister was obliged to withdraw his statement but in
doing so he added a premonitory rider:
To give the natives the opportunity of being
trained in their own areas is part of the
policy of apartheid. It is obvious that in
applying this policy care will be exercised
to obviate any injustice to European artisans.69
The meaning of this warning was to be made clear the
following year when, in October 1949, a Native Building
Workers Bill aimed at determining precisely the degree to
which African 'advancement1 in the building trades would be
tolerated, was gazetted. The heavily restrictive measures
it contained - particularly a clause enabling the Governor-
General to prohibit Africans from performing "any specified
class of skilled work within any area specified in the pro-
clamation in which any wage-regulating measure applies"&9
- provoked concerted opposition both within the House and
outside it, and the Bill was withdrawn. It was retabled
during the 19 51 session with amendments which relaxed the
earlier definition of 'native areas' and made it possible
for Africans to work outside "their own areas on buildings
owned or occupied by them", 90 and in this form was finally
passed.
The 1951 Native Building Workers Act introduced -
for the first time since the passage of the Mines and Works
Amendment Act in 1926 - a'job colour bar' based on explicit
legislative requirements rather than on the somewhat tenuous
legitimation afforded by the 'traditional' racial division
of labour. The capacity of the white building unions to
exercise effective control over the use of African labour
in the building industry through the Native Building Workers
Advisory Board was underwritten by the restrictive conditions
embodied in the Act. In the words of a contemporary observer,
it was clearly intended "to establish a pattern of apartheid
in industry by providing for the training and registration
of Natives to build houses for their own people in their
own areas at rates of pay differing from those applied by
industrial agreements".91 The restriction on the employment
of African building workers to "their own areas" represented
a significant achievement in the attempt of the white working
class to defend its relatively privileged situation against the
threat posed by the influx of Africans into jobs formerly occu-
pied by whites. The strategic position held by white buil-
ding artisans in the midst of a national housing crisis had
merely placed them first in what was to become a queue of
white workers demanding such protection as a quid pro quo
for their continued support in the political arena. 92
Hence, although the passage of the Act was to enable subst-
antial savings to be made on the construction costs of
African housing - and so indirectly benefit the employers of
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African labour - it had only been secured by conceding the
principle of 'job reservation' to the white working class.
The resolution of this pivotal issue in the Nationalists'
approach to the African housing problem can be seen, then,
to have reflected with some accuracy the conjunctural balance
of class forces in the South African social formation.
The other major issue thrust into open debate by the
new government's determination to take control of the crisis
which confronted it was the vexed question of the incidence of
financial responsibility in the provision o": sub-economic
African housing. It emerg.ed_unmls_takably^ in__S_eptember j^ 948
during the Budgets-debate, when the Minister of Native ~Af Fairs ,
in a clash with a member of the Opposition over" influx
policy, denied that there had been a "legitimate" influx of
Africans to the urban areas and asserted that the task "of
providing houses for "tens of thousands of natives" Was beco-
ming "intolerable". He then went on to say:
An amazing feature of the oosition is this:
that, particularly in dealing with urban
natives in the past, employers, who are
really the people responsible for the natives
being in the urban areas, have been left out
of the picture entirely ... I think that the
time will come - and the matter has been enquired
into - when employers will have to assume respon-
sibility for their native employees, responsibility
with regard to their housing.93
The reaction o^ employers to the implicit threat contained
in the Minister's declaration was predictable. Recognising
that to accept some of the financial responsibilitv for the
costs of housing their African labour force would effectively
apply a brake to the rate at which the latter"s labour power
could be substituted for the more expensive labour power of
white workers, they fell back on the ideas that had been expr-
essed some months earlier in the report of the Pagan Commis-
sion. The President of the Transvaal Chamber o^ Industries
contended that African housing was a "national problem"
which could not be thrown on to industry and added:
We feel that it is a matter for the State, rather
than for industry to bear the cost of sub-economic
housing for natives. We must gradually work to-
wards a state where the native becomes an economic
entity in himself. It will be the responsibility
of industry to see that the native ultimately gets
an economic wage. That will only come after the
native has become more productive. This will only
be after some of the restrictions of the job col-
our bar have been removed and the native is given
more opportunity to learn skilled and semi-skilled
work.9"11
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With the chief protagonists' stakes now clearly
on the table and the local authorities standing by to deal
with any attempt to pass the main burden of financial
responsibility back to them, the Minister convened a con-
ference of the interested parties to discuss the matter
on 26 April 1949 in Cape Town. Present were delegates
from various state departments, officials of the United
Municipal Executive (UMF), and representatives of the
major employers' organizations including the Federated
Chamber of Industries (FCI), the Associated Chamber of
Commerce (ASSOCOM) and the Handelsinstituut.95 The pro-
ceedings opened with a speech by the Minister in which he
warned that people planning to start new industries should
"provide in their calculations for the cost of housing
their Native employees", adding that he personally envisaged
a rent subsidy. With this blunt statement of intent, the
industrialists present were forced into a defensive position
from which they eventually managed to close the meeting with
a resolution submitted by the FCI - castigated by a repre-
sentative of the UME as "futile and a waste of time" - pro-
posing that the matter be referred to a commission "which
could coopt experts" and report back within six months.96
Despite what had been reported to be "high hopes in
many quarters" that "important steps to formulate a nation-
al policy on Native housing" would be taken,9 7 the confer-
ence had ended with no visible evidence of such progress.
And yet, although the wrangling would continue for another
three years in various 'consultative committees', another
trilateral conference, and - with the introduction and subse-
quent withdrawal of the Native Housing and Transport Levy
Bill of 1951 - in Parliament as well, certain steps towards
the problem's eventual resolution had already been taken.
The passage of the Native Services Levy Act_ jji 1952_ would
be the result, on JbfieT^ QJie J^ jfiU,I_o.f~ a process of accommodation
by both employer organizations and the government of the
need to achieve, a^wprka.ble compromise and, on the other, of
a substantia^^re^striicturing of the state apparatus, reflec-
ting~the increasing dominance of the Department of Native
Affairs in the formulation of African housing policy.
A necessary preliminary step had involved the reorgan-
ization of._the Directorate of Housing - on which the National
Housing and Planning Commission (NHPC) was dependent for
'technical services' - to bring it more closely under the
control of the Minister of Health, and the appointment to the
Commission of several members allegedly more sympathetic
to the government's aim than their precessors. 8 One of
the first decisions of the reconstituted Commission was that
the NatiQnaJ^iiojising Scheme, initiated under the previous
government in 1944, had "resulted in wasteful expenditure
of government funds."
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On its recommendation, the scheme was abolished in September
1949 and the interest rate carried by sub-economic housing
loans reverted to the pre-1944 figure of 3/4 per cent, but
the condition that local authorities should bear a minimum
loss of 1 x/t* per cent was dropped.99 The latter, however,
received the announcement without enthusiasm and the Insti-
tute of Race Relations was driven to comment in the annual
Survey: "This virtually, means the end of Native housing by
the looaJL authorities^"1Q ° NevertheleIs~,"a" y^a"f™rater, the
NHPC was to take its concern with "wasteful expenditure"
a step further and,in accordance with "sound business
principles", to suggest that:
the State and local government
should provide only the minimum needs of
those who are unable to help themselves.
Anything above the strictly minimum require-
ments must be regarded as non-essential, to
be provided by the tenant at his own cost as
his economic position improves .... housing
should as far as possible be on a fully eco-
nomic basis and .... the capital cost of
dwellings should be adapted to the income
of the particular groups 1 0 1
The move to place state provision of housing on a
"fully economic basis" must be placed in the context of
the drastic tightening of the Treasury's purse strings
which in 1949 had induced the Secretary of Health, "in his
capacity as accounting officer" for the NHPC's budgetary
allocation, to unilaterally slash the Commission's request
for £18im to initiate a five-year housing programme to
£8$m.102 The Treasury's position was in turn clearly a
reflection of the downturn in the economy which had followed
the peaking of the wartime boom in 1947 and which settled
during the early 50s (except in the mining and farming
sectors) into a period of "virtual stagnation".103 Beyond
these considerations, however, the Commission's insistence
that "sound business principles" provided "the only basis
upon which both the State and local authorities can afford
to undertake a housing programme on as extensive a basis as
the urgency of the problem dictates" may be interpreted as
an attempt to persuade a wider audience of the state's
bone fides in demanding a contribution from employers should
the costs of such a programme prove to be beyond its finan-
cial means. For, despite its contention that "a considerable
proportion of the urban Native labour is remunerated on a
scale which should make the planning of economic housing
possible", 10" the NHPC would have had to allow for the"
possibility that the "proportion of the population which
cannot afford even the most modest dwelling except on a
subsidised basis" might turn out to be greater than had been
suggested.
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At the very least, it must have been aware of the opinion
expressed in the annual report of the Department of Native
Affairs published only the year before, that:
The economic status of the great majority
of Native families living in towns is
such that they are unable to pay
normal house rent and must be provided
with sub-economic housing.... Though wage
levels have risen and cost of living allowances
have been added to normal earnings, these
increases have not bridged the gap for the
bulk of the Native urban population between
economic dependance and independence.1°5
Certainly the need to obtain a 'scientific' perspective on
this question and on the related problem of how "the capital
cost of dwellings should be adapted to the income of parti-
cular groups'* had already been recognized in the low-cost
housing research programme initiated by the National Building
Research Institute in 194 7 - a point to which we shall return
below. It was, however, still possible for the Minister of
Native Affairs to announce in the Senate in May 1951 that
the government had dec ided not to proceed with the Native
Housing and Transport Levy Bill "in view of the possibility
of economic housing schemes for the majority of Africans". °6
But by then "economic housing schemes " were beginning to
mean something rather different, and the shift had much to
do with the increasingly significant role that was being
played by the Department of Native Affairs in defining the
direction of African housing policy.
Prior to Dr. W.M.M. Eiselen's appointment as Secretary
for Native Affairs in October 1949 the Department's contri-
butions to the problem of overcoming the massive backlog in
African housing had remained largely either negative or dida-
ctic. In its concern to ensure that "firstly, urban Natives
are satisfactorily housed in the shortest possible time and,
secondly, that rentals charged for the houses are within the
means of the Natives to pay", it had been forced to withhold
approval of some of the excessively costly schemes submitted
by local authorities under the National Housing formula.
More positively, it had called for research into low-cost
housing and the "employment of Native artisans on schemes
for urban location housing", and had cooperated with ISCOR
and "groups of industrialists at Johannesburg and Vereeniging"
regarding "the provision by them of accommodation for Native
workers and their families .... (as) a means of supplementing
the efforts of local authorities to overcome the acute shor-
tage of Native housing".107 By 1948 the Department was
advocating the adoption of the 'Bloemfontein system', because
it was "convinced that the acceptance of this suggestion by
large local authorities will assist materially in meeting
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the situation". 1 0 8 But with the appointment of Eiselen,
and even more so after Verwoerd was brought into the
Cabinet as Minister of Native Affairs in October 1950, the
relationship between the Department and the NHPC began to
change. In its annual report for 1950, the latter - after
recording that a Joint Committee had been established with
the Department of Native Affairs "to coordinate all work
undertaken by these two bodies in connection with Native
housing, with a view to ensuring a uniform policy and uni-
form requirements" - was to note that: "The full collabera-
tion with the Department of Native Affairs in respect of
Native housing, initiated during the year, marks a new
phase in Native policy."109 The progression of the Depart-
ment from a more or less consultative role to that of at
least equal partnership in the formulation of African hous-
ing policy was confirmed in the statement, which appeared in
precisely the same form in the reports of both bodies, that:
"In future. Native housing schemes will be examined by the
Commission and the Department of Native Affairs acting jointly
and concurrently and not, as in the past, separatelv and
successively."1 °
Under the architects of apartheid, however, the Depart-
ment of Native Affairs could not long remain merely a coequal,
and its growing dominance within the 'partnership' can be
seen in the way in which the respective annual reports of the
two organizations record the development of 'native housing'
policy after 1950. The increasingly confident pronouncements
of the Secretary for Native Affairs in this respect are para-
lleled by the diminuition and then the complete disappearance
of any discussion of the subject in the NHPC reports. Unques-
tionably, it was from within the Department of Native Affairs
that the 'site and service' approach emerged during 1952 and
through its insistent canvassing of support and the applica-
tion of not always subtle pressure that the idea took root
as the putative 'solution' to the African housing problem
over the next two years. There is, furthermore, no doubt
that the Department's primary interest in the matter was in
response to the widespread political mobilization of the
African population during the early 50s. Commenting on the
"explosive situation" in mid-1951, Eiselen drew some inter-
esting conclusions:
In the nature of things, the urban areas are
in themselves a fruitful breeding ground for
unrest because the Native, population has increased
so rapidly__that housing measures could bv no means
keep pace with "the great influx of population.
. To control the-o-veipupirl a-tred "Villages held in
Native ownership such as Sophiatown and Alexandra
and the numerous squatter camps around the
Witwatersrand and Pretoria efficiently, would
be attempting the impossible ... The most pressing
single need of the Native community is more ade-
quate _hpusing. Only by the provision of adeauate
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shelter in properly planned Native townships
can full control over urban Natives be regained,
because only then will it be possible to elimi-
nate the surplus Natives who do not seek or find
an honest living in the cities,111
The 'site and service' approach then, represented pre-
cisely the means by which "adequate shelter in properly
planned Native townships" could be provided fast enough to
match the urgency of the situation without drawing excessive-
ly on the limited allocation of funds available for conven-
tional housing. As one of the prime movers in the develop-
ment of the concept was to write a few years later:
To solve this problem (the "Bantu housing
problem") as economically and speedily as possi-
ble, the Department devised the site-and-service
scheme as an adjunct to normal housing schemes.
The financial resources of the country do not
permit of its solution by means of orthodox
methods with any reasonable degree of rapidity
. . . site and service schemes__are complementary
to and not in substitution of normal housing
schemes- Neither must they be regarded , as is
often done, as just a controlled form of squatting
... The initial dwellings, which the inhabitants
of a site-and-service scheme are required to
erect are only temporary until such time as the
local authority or the Bantu himself is able to
build a standard type dwelling.112
Unstated here, but explicitly recognized by both this and
other commentators as the necessary corollary of the 'site
and service' approach was the need to secure a source of
income to finance its implementation without diverting
funds from the 'complementary' effort to provide conventional
housing. Quite clearly the establishment of just such a
revenue source was the essential object of the legislation
finally enacted in the Native Services L e w Act of 1952.
Various proposals to transfer at least some of the
financial burden of accommodating the African labour force
in urban areas to its employers had been put forward by the
government - and contested by the employers - over the three
years since the abortive conference convened by the Minister
of Native Affairs in 1949. Initially the debate had revolved
around the idea that any levy on employers would be used in
the provision of housing as such. With the development of the
site and service concept, however, it had become apparent
that the revenue derived from the proposal levy could be
employed a great deal more effectively in overcoming the
immediate problem of regaining "full control over urban
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Natives" if its use were to be restricted to financing the
installation of only those services without which no "proper-
ly planned township" could function: essentiallv the pro-
vision of access roads, the supply of clean water and the
removal of domestic waste (i.e. sewage and refuse). Further-
more , the ability to present the levy in this way - as a
limited, contingent measure to resolve the potentially
'explosive' crisis which had arisen - provided the state
with a useful means of mollifying the resistance of employ-
ers to its imposition. As Verwoerd, in an address to the
FCI in 1954, was concerned . to point out:
It was a clear and definite understanding
between myself and representatives of Commerce
and Industry that the levy should be instit-
uted for a certain purpose. That purpose was
to provide services in each urban area on a
sufficient number of sites for housing the
requirements of labour in that area ... if
within a certain region the levy has provided
all the services needed there, then that
particular region can approach me to remove
the levy.113
Although the representatives of commerce and industry
had continued to voice their objection "in principle to the
form of taxation envisaged in the Native Services Levy Bill
because it was tantamount to a discrimination in wages on a
racial issue", they had finally had "to agree with the Mini-
ster that a positive Native housing programme could be
delayed no longer"111* and the Bill passed into law in June
1952. The provisions of the Act came into operation on 1st
January 1953 in 18 major urban areas(automatically in the
case of those with African populations of more than 20 000) ,
making it mandatory for employers in those areas to pay an
amount of 2s. 6-d to the local authority " in respect of every
six days worked by an adult male Native in his employ";
automatic exemptions were made in the case of domestic
servants or where employees were housed free of charge in
approved quarters by their employer. In the five largest
urban areas provision was made for the payment of 6d. from
each contribution collected to the Secretary of Transport
"for the subsidisation of Native transport services". All
revenue derived from the levy was to be paid into the Servi-
ces Levy Fund, which formed part of the local authority's
statutory Native Revenue Account, and could be used to meet
expenditure incurred in "the provision of water, sanitation,
lighting and road services outside a location. Native village
or Native hostel under the control of that local authority
for which purposes National Housing Funds are not available".
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A further provision enabled the Minister of Native Affairs
to authorise the expenditure of levy funds on the same
services inside a 'location1.115 It was estimated that the
total annual revenue derived from the imposition of the levy
would be about £1 750 000, of which employers in Johannesburg
would contribute some £450 000. l l 6
With the passage of the Native Services Levy Ac t__and,
earlier, of the Native Building Warners ftrt'*r,,th<* government
had successfully resolved the two major issues confronting
it in its attempt to establish the legislative framework it
required to tackle the formidable problem with which it had
been presented.117 Within the framework, a coherent, two-
phase strategy had been formulated to enable the state
housing apparatus to approach its task systematically: in
the first phase, the 'squatter problem' was to be brought
under control as quickly as possible through the extensive
application of site and service methods; in the second
phase, the temporary" dwellings Tn~the site and service sche-
mes were to be gradually replaced by permanent, convention-
ally-built houses, either through the 'self-help' efforts
of the inhabitants €fieTrf selves'" or through the intervention
of the local authorities, as far as possible on an 'economic'
_ba.s 1 sVJ^Jlthpugh" certain reservations persisted - the Insti-
tute of Race Relations, for instance, doubted whether the
maximum 30-year leasehold permitted by the government would
provide sufficient security of tenure to induce these Afric-
ans who could afford it to build their own houses 1 1 8 -
it was nevertheless clear that for the first time since the
squatter movement had revealed itself during the war a
policy adequate to the magnitude of the crisis had been ar-
rived at. But perhaps equally significant was the fact that
the evolution of the policy had been matched by the develop-
ment of the 'technical' means of its implementation - the
models and techniques through which it might be given concrete,
physical form.
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
had been established as a statutory body in late 1945 and
charged with the specific role of providing a 'scientific'
foundation to the state's post-war reconstruction programme.
With a year, the National Building Research Institute (NBRI)
had been set up as a relatively autonomous unit within the
CSIR and had defined its primary task in terms of a programme
of fundamental research into the provision of low-cost urban
housing. The initial products of this programme were a study
of contemporary sub-economic housing practice and evaluations
of certain experimental types of 'Native housing'. By the
end of 1947 a Research Committee on Minimum Standards of
Accommodation in South Africa had been convened at the request
of the NHPC to "examine critically the tentative proposals
suggested for minimum standards below which no dwellings
should be erected."119
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The objective was to develop criteria - based on "the best
available information on the living patterns of the low
income groups in South Africa" - "which could be taken by
the planner and translated on the drawing board into a
house plan".120 The essential premise on which the research
programme had been based was later to be articulated by the
first Director of the NBRI in the following terms:
Housing starts as a social and health problem.
Good housing tends to promote good citizens,
and hence stable conditions in society; satis-
factory housing is essential for the good phy-
sical health of a people and for the proper
functioning of good family life which is the
keystone of our civilization. Conversely,
poor housing produces discomfort and discontent
leading to an anti-social outlook, an increase
in crime, the breeding of epidemics and a host
of other social evils.121
Other areas of investigation in the programme included
an examination of the "economics of housing estate develop-
ment" (to determine the 'optimum1 layout and density criteria
for township design), research into minimum performance
standards for dwellings (to define 'functional efficiency'
criteria for the physical properties of houses), and an
extensive and influential study on the costs of 'urban
Bantu housing1, which focused on the use of alternative
materials and improved building techniques and on the
'rational' exploitation of African labour.122 In addition,
a series of standard house plans - including the now ubiquitous
Type NE 51/6 and 51/9 designs - based on the recommended
minimum space standards and a thorough investigation of inter-
nal circulation patterns had been drawn up by the Institute's
Architectural Division for the NHPC.x23
By the early 50s the research was considered sufficient-
ly advanced to require the submission of its findings to the
rigours of field testing. The opportunity to test some of
the hypotheses concerning the 'optimum' layout of townships
arose in September 1949 when the Witbank Municipality reque-
sted the WBRI's assistance in achieving a greater density
of housing (i.e. increasing the number of units in a- given
area) in the planning of its new African township. The
design exercise, which included a survey of socio-economic
conditions in the existing 'location', revealed the need to
develop a more systematic approach to such work and the
proposal of the Springs Town Council towards the end of 1950
that the NBRI should formulate proposals for an 'experimental'
township to relieve overcrowding in the old 'location' at
Payneville was enthusiastically received as a chance to do
precisely that. 12*
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The experiment at Kwa-Thema, as the new township was
later named, proved to be something of a landmark in
South African low-cost housing practice in at least two
important respects. On the one hand, the effectiveness
of African building workers operating on a 'task1 basis
in municipal direct labour teams was convincingly demonstra-
ted when production figures of more than 8 houses a day were
achieved. 25 The role played by the Springs Town Engineer,
A.J. Archibald, in successfully applying the production tech-
niques developed by the NBRI was to lead to his appointment
as the Johannesburg Municipality's first Director of Housing
in 1953 and his methods were soon being emulated by local
authority housing departments throughout the country. On the
other hand, the results of the survey carried out in Payne-
ville by the NBRI's sociological research team were soon
recognized as "very important" with possible "far-reaching
effects on the Native housing situation everywhere in South
Africa". The key finding was that, in a sample of 319
African families in Payneville, some 40 per cent could be
said to fall into a category capable of paying 'economic'
rentals, while 13 per cent fell into a 'sub-economic' cate-
gory and 47 per cent into a 'sub-sub-economic' category.12 6
The 'scientific' discovery of a relatively large proportion -
but in no way the majority - of African families able to pay
'economic rentals' flatly contradicted the prediction made
some months earlier by the Minister of Native Affairs that
economic housing schemes had now become a possibility for
the majority of Africans in urban areas.127 The Department
of Native Affairs nevertheless saw in the result a vindica-
tion of its attempts to induce local authorities to place
the provision of African housing - "wherever possible" -
on a "fully economic basis". Its annual Report for 1950-51
noted that "the inability or apathy of many local authorities
to embark upon extensive housing schemes for Natives" was
"no doubt" due to the "heavy financial losses" suffered on
sub-economic schemes, and continued:
Surveys indicated, however, that many
Natives, especially in the larger urban
areas, were earning economic wages/ but
occupying sub-economic houses. As a result
of these surveys several local authorities
such as Benoni, Vanderbijl Park and Bloem-
fontein tackled the question energetically
and every effort was made to house their
Native population on an economic basis.
It is hoped that other Municipalities will
follow their lead and provide economic
houses for Natives earning economic wages.
And, for those "Natives who could not afford economic rentals"
the Report tersely added, "'austerity' sub-economic houses
were provided".12®
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On the basis of the Payneville study, it was decided
to set up a Committee on Socio-Economic Surveys for Native
Housing Research consisting of representatives from the
CSIR, the National Council for Social Research and the
Department of Native Affairs to direct similar surveys in
other centres in order to "obtain a national picture of the
rent-paying ability of urban Native families in South Africa".
With the assistance of Professor E. Batson - a key figure
in the Cape Town poverty studies of the early 40s - surveys
were eventually carried out in Cape Town, Durban, New Brigh-
ton (Port Elizabeth), Vereeniging and Katlehong (Germiston).12 9
At its final meeting in 1958, the Committee confirmed that
the three socio-economic groups identified in Payneville
were valid for the other centres and categorized each group's
capacity to pay rent as follows:
(a) " ... an important proportion of urban
Native households can afford to pay eco-
nomic rentals for adequate houses without
jeopardizing their health and basic require-
ments for living";
(b) "... a relatively small but significant
proportion of households which, although
capable of paying some rent, cannot pay
a full economic rent"; and
(c) ".... a large proportion of the urban Bantu
community, generally the largest of the three
socio-economic sub-divisions, which cannot
afford to pay any rent without jeopardizing
their requirements for the minimum necess-
ities of life, or alternatively, forcing
them into illegal and other anti-social
practices for augmenting income."
It concluded, finally, that:
The situation ... is a complex of factors
that include the level of earnings and
taxation and the cost of food, clothing,
fuel and transport as well as the cost of
housing. To attempt to solve 'the housing
problem1 in terms solely of bricks and mortar,
of site and service, or even of rent and accomm-
odation would be to mistake the nature of the
problem. 1 3 0
But by then, of course, "the housing problem" was already
well on the way to being 'solved' - by a massive effort
directed precisely at "bricks and mortar... site and service"
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- and the adequacy of the 'solution' was not to be serious-
ly challenged for almost two decades.
In its annual Report for 1955-56, the CSIR noted
that: "The emphasis of work on housing (in the NBP.I) , which
has hitherto been concentrated on various aspects of accom-
modation for the urban Bantu, has now shifted to housing
for Europeans in the lower income groups."131 We may con-
clude that the task of the NBRI and the agencies with which
it had co-operated in developing the techniques and prac-
tices to enable the state to realise its African housing
policy in material form had been successfully completed.
In essence, the 'scientific' contribution to the resolu-
tion of the African housing crisis consisted of a set of
cost-efficient methods of building cheap but 'adequate'
housing to minimum space and material standards in 'optimally'
rationalised layouts - its product can be seen in almost
every township in South Africa. It is to an account of
how the resolution of the crisis was achieved in one parti-
cular urban area - Johannesburg - that we now turn.
IV
The establishment of the Moroka Emergency Camp in
1947 and the acceptance of a policy of 'controlled squat-
ting' had provided the Johannesburg City Council with an
at least temporarily effective means of containing the
threat posed by autonomous squatter movements. It also
seems to have marked the moment at which the Council's
never really whole-hearted commitment to accommodating
its African population faltered and then simply fell
apart. Certainly the task with which it was confronted
was of an overwhelming magnitude - estimated in mid-1948
to involve the provision of some 62 000 houses over the
next five years132 - and the apparent inability of the
NHPC to formulate a coherent and practicable policy approach
at the national level in the period before 1948 had obviously
done little to instil anv confidence that effective action
might be taken by the central government. In addition, the
restrictions on building programmes during and after the war
had further exacerbated the situation: although the Council
had, between August 1940 and March 1947, placed contracts
for the construction of 10 730 houses and a hostel to accom-
modate 3 850 men, it had been possible during that time to
complete and occunv only 1 848 houses and the hostel.133
The major problem, however, remained -. as it had done through-
out the various attempts to achieve complete residential
segregation of the city's African population during the pre-
vious forty - odd years - the reluctance of the Council to
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incur any expenditure on African housing which might have to
be passed onto its electorate, the (mostly) white ratepayers.
The task of systematically unravelling and critically
analysing the complexities of Johannesburg's Native Revenue
Account has not yet been undertaken. We must therefore ac-
cept the judgment of P.R.B. Lewis - a former Chairman of the
Council's Non-European Affairs Committee - that, at least
until 196 5 when he was writing, the Account remained consis
tently in deficit and was balanced annually only by debitino
the Rates Fund.13" By 1947, the cumulative deficit on
the Native Revenue Account had reached a total of roughly
Rl 250 000, of which some R610 000 had been incurred during
1946 and 1947 {1965 figures).135 It is understandable,
then, that those controlling the city1s finances perceived
their role to be primarily that of resisting, or at least
limiting the Council's commitment to any undertaking which
would introduce further deficits into the Account. Hence,
even the "very favourable" National Housing formula for sub-
economic housing loans, introduced after negotiations between
the NHPC and the United Municipal Executive in 1944, had been
accepted only with strong reservations 1 3 6 and no great eff-
ort had been made to take advantage of it prior to its abol-
ition by the Nationalist government in 1949. In fact, as
against the NEAD's estimate of an immediate backlog of
57 000 houses for Africans in mid-1949, the City Council -
during the five years that the National Housing Scheme had
been in operation - had applied for loans to finance the
construction of some 13 10O houses.137 Furthermore, much
of the housing that had been approved had never been built,
apparently because of the continuing shortages of building
materials and skilled labour: between 1945 and 1953 a total
of only 8 292 houses were actually constructed, all in Orlando
and Jabavu.13 e
The installation of the Nationalist government in 1948
and the subsequent reorganization of the NHPC to bring it
more closely in line with the new Cabinet's policies did
little to improve communications between the United Party -
controlled City Council and the central state apparatus.
With the economy sliding into the recession of the late 40s
and capital becoming increasingly scarce, the announcement
by the Minister of Native Affairs that "future Native housing
schemes should be shorn of non-essentials in design and ameni-
ties and should be as cheap as possible"x39seems to have sup-
plied the pretext which the dominant group within the Council
needed to suspend the provision of sub-economic housing
altogether. The Chairman of the Council's Finance Committee,
during his Budget speech in June 1949, claimed that the
Minister's directive was "a blessing in disguise" and, as a
contemporary observer was to allege three years later: "Talk
about building houses ceased thereafter."1 ° Given the overt
antipathy of this particular observer for the Chairman of the
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Finance Committee, the statement cannot be taken at its
face value, but it is correct that the Council had not in
fact initiated any new housing schemes between 194 7 and
1951 and that some £3m of the £8m allocated by the NHPC
to the Council during the same period had not been taken
UP-1*1
However, while the Council had not managed to ini-
tiate any new construction, it had put forward at least
one major proposal in addition to the Dube Native village
scheme, which had been first mooted in 1946 as a comple-
ment to the ill-fated, earlier proposal for a freehold vil-
lage in the Zuurbekom area. The Dube scheme was intended
"for those more affluent urbanized Natives who desire and
can afford to build their own homes to the European standard"
but it soon encountered some resistance on the part of pros-
pective home-owners who did not believe that they were "of-
fered full security of tenure" in the proposed 99-year lease-
hold arrangement.1 The Vukuzenzele ('self-help') scheme,
on the other hand, had been evolved "in view of the lack of
capital monies to finance conventional building schemes and
in the light of the success of Natives building their own
homes at Moroka (Emergency Camp)" and was essentially a modi-
fied version of the 'Bloemfontein system1. "Approved Natives"
were to be leased plots on which they were to be encouraged
to build their own houses under supervision; concrete
foundations and "essential services" including a water supply,
sanitation and roads were to be provided before building
operations started. Of the 4 640 stands in the area sur-
veyed, 1 348 were to be developed in this way under the super-
vision of the City Councilr 1 787 were to be used for an
"austerity building scheme" consisting of three-roomed houses,
and the remaining 1 505 were to be set aside for development
by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce.143
The Chamber, in March 19 50, had formulated "a short
term plan to provide economic housing for the 15 000 African
families who were registered applicants for houses" also
essentially along the lines of the 'Bloemfontein system1,
but with building materials financed by "a specially-raised
economic loan", A "representative" Citizen's Native Housing
Committee (CNHC) had been constituted "to further the accep-
tance of the scheme" lhh and the City Council's proposal,
which emerged some four months later, was clearly a response
to the pressure which had been exerted on it. The CNHC,
however, rejected the Council's scheme, chiefly on the
grounds that the monthly site rental and service charge pro-
posed by the Council was excessive "in relation to the ser-
vices offered and the inadequacy of the size of the proposed
stands" (33 x 37* feet). It then escalated its demands,
pressing for an "economic home-ownership scheme" on larger
stands (40 x 60 feet), for which the Council would advance
building loans.11*5
A Place to Live 40
For its part, the Council decided to continue with the
scheme it had prepared since the latter had been "fully
investigated" by officials of the Department of. Native Af-
fairs who, it was believed, "had submitted a favourable rec-
ommendation to the Cabinet". Commenting on the activities
of the CNHC, the Chairman of the Council's Special Housing
Committee noted that it had only been when the government
announced its intention of imposing a housing levy on the
employers of African labour that the Chamber of Commerce had
formed the Native Housing Committee:
In the initial stages of discussion with
the Council, the Chamber repeatedly undertook
to find the funds to enable Natives to build
their own homes, thus making it more profitable
for the employers to lend money at an economic
interest rather than to pav a monthly levy. This
.... was the motive behind the Chamber's sudden
interest in Native housing.146
With discussions apparently deadlocked, the CNHC switched
tactics, supplementing its role as an 'independent' pressure
group outside the Council by establishing a substantial
presence within it. By 1952, three members of its executive
had been elected to the Council and were mounting a sustained
and skilfully directed attack on the group clustered around
G.B. Gordon, leader of the United Party in the Council,
Chairman of the Finance Committee, former Mayor and the
"strong man of the Council" according to a contemporary
commentator.1147 The conflict between the two groups became
extremely bitter, often degenerating to what the same commen-
tator described as "undignified bickering".148 Its signifi-
cance here, however, lies in what it reveals o^ the matrix
of class forces represented within this local apparatus of
the state.
The association of the group of "so-called 'rebel' coun-
cillors" with the local representatives of commercial and
industrial capital is clearly evident in both the origins
and the composition of the Citizen's Native Housing Committee.
By contrast, in the material so far examined, there is no
direct indication, of the specific class or fractional inter-
ests with which the group led by Gordon might be identified149
Nevertheless, in its constant and spirited championing of
the cause of the 'ratepayers', 15° we may hypothesize the
presence of at least part of what has elsewhere been called
the 'urban bourgeoisie' - that group of agents with interests
clearly linked to the processes of urban 'development':
landlords, property speculators, estate agents, building
societies, construction firms, etc.151 It will not be possi-
ble here to do more than merely sketch the outlines of the
still undeveloped theoretical analysis on which this idea is
based, but it is perhaps necessary to do at least that.
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Briefly, the development of urban segregation in South
Africa can be seen to have produced a highly specific form
of the 'urban land market1 and the associated 'housing
market1, from which certain large residential areas - the
municipal 'locations' or townships - have been entirely
separated. Within these areas, the commodities land and
housing do not circulate - in the sense of 'free' exchange
- at all, or only circulate subject to severe constraints
which do not operate elsewhere. Such areas therefore
present few or no opportunities for accumulation by the
agents of circulation capital - property speculators, estate
agents and building societies - who in any case, along with
white landlords, have until now been excluded from them on
the basis of racially-defined identity. For these agents,
because the increased rate levied on property which would
result from the Rates Fund being used to 'subsidise' the
Native Revenue Account__c_o_uld not be matched by increased
opportunities for accumulation, the City Council's responsi-
bility_for the^prpyJlsioiL of African housing was inevitably
a 'burden' which should be shed if possible, but which should
certainly not be made any heavier. For the agents of produc-
tive capital in the shape of the construction firms, on the
other hand, the massive building programmes which would be
required to supply the housing stock of the new townships
represented major possibilities for accumulation, particu-
larly for the larger firms.1S2
Such an analysis offers us one possible explanation of
the intense resistance maintained by the majority group with-
in the Council during the late 40s and early 50s to the idea
that the primary responsibility for tackling the crisis was
its own. 1" It clearly suggests that certain material con-
siderations underlay the response of the Chairman of the Fin-
ance Committee in late 1951 to the "continuous fire of
criticism" directed at the Council. The "categorical assump-
tion" that the "entire responsibility" in the matter "rested
on local authorities" and that the "only State aid was to sup-
ply municipalities with cheap money" he was reported to have
said, "had to be refuted". The report continued:
If the provision of housing was not the
responsibility of the State, it surely was
much less that of the municipal or local
authority. The State, which drew its income
by direct and indirect taxes from all classes
of the community, as against the local authority,
which had to raise its income from a small sec-
tion - the owners of fixed property in a muni-
cipal area - was surely the proper body to provide
public help if such help was a necessity in
special circumstances. h
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In contrast the 'rebel' group in the Council while
it remained within the ambit of the United Party at the
more general 'political' level, was linked to a very differ-
ent organizational base with possibly only a contingent
interest in 'local1, as opposed to 'national' questions -
as had been suggested by the Chairman of the Council's
Special Housing Committee.155 The resistance of employer
organizations to the imposition of a levy to meet part of the
costs of accommodating its African work force - which, it
should be remembered, was to be administered on a 'regional'
basis 1 5 6 - was, however, tempered by recognition of the
economic and political dangers consequent upon a failure
to respond to the reproduction crisis in which the African
working class was enmeshed. Thus, commenting on the assertion
by the Chairman of the Council's Finance Committee that the
housing of Johannesburg's "45 000 Native workers" represented
an "insuperable task", an editorial in The Manufacturer1
(official journal of the FCI) suggested that:
.... the civic authorities and organized
industry can envisage a troubled future.
Industry may have to deal with a discontented
labour force brought about through insufficient
housing, while the civic authorites will have
to contend with more crime.
After noting that the FCI had "expressed itself strongly
about such a form of discriminatorv taxation" when the matter
of a levy on employers of African labour was first raised, the
editorial went on:
We pointed out that wages were related to the
nature of the work for which the Natives were paid.
Since no wage discrimination based on race or col-
our was observed by industry it followed that no
one racial group should be singled out for spec-
ial treatment ... (However) wishing to see posit-
ive action against the evils of Native slum condi-
tions, we accepted the levy and compromised our
principles.15 7
But there was a further, ideological dimension to the
question and the notions of both 'property' and 'the house
for the wage' to be advanced. So, as the CNHC was to urge
in a pamphlet published in 1953, there was:
One solution - home ownership. Johannesburg
has in the past always built Native houses
on a sub-economic basis. The Johannesburg
Citizens' Housing Committee is convinced
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that one major factor in the solution of
the housing problem is to allow the Native
to build or buy on an economic basis. The
Ratepayer suffers no further financial loss,
and the Native would acquire a stake in the
township in which he lives ... There is no
better remedy for discontent, unrest, rioting
and crime than for the Native to have a per-
sonal interest in the place in which he lives158
And, as a statement issued by ASSOCOM was to claim:
To commerce the credit is due for the
formation of the concept of the economic
Native house, advanced many years ago in
the face of considerable opposition of local
authorities, which principle is now one of
the cornerstones of accepted policy on Native
housing.15 9
For industry and commerce, then, the solution appeared
to be to both have the cake of a contented African labour
force accommodated in their own 'economic1 homes, and to
eat it, by continuing to pay the 'economic' wage - if
necessary at the expense of the entrenched privileges of the
white working class. We have seen, however, that the Johan-
nesburg City Council had already attempted to come to terms
with the 'cornerstone' of the government's African housing
policy in the Vukuzenzele scheme. The attempt was not
to be successful: some two years after the proposal had been
formulated in mid-1950, it was reported that, "through unfore-
seen circumstances, the finalisation of the Vukuzenzele Scheme
has not been completed".xG° A month later, in July 1952,
the Council adopted a resolution that, "subject to the
National Housing and Planning Commission's providing the
necessary funds", it would embark on a "large-scale Native
housing programme" involving the construction "departmentally
and/or under contract" of 2 500 houses a year for five years
"on the Vukuzenzele layout and other areas, using Native
labour wherever possible."161
The change of direction should be seen in the light of
two, possibly not unconnected developments during the pre-
vious six months in the always problematic relationship be-
tween the Council and the agencies controlling the implemen-
tation of the central government's housing policy. The first
had been the recognition that the Council and the government
agencies were unlikely to reach agreement on what were to be
considered to be 'essential' services in the 'economic'
Vukuzenzele scheme. The Council was, of course, under pres-
sure from the CNHC to improve the levels of service proposed
for the scheme and, in any event, it made sound engineering
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sense to install services of a standard consonant with
the final development of a scheme in its initial phases
{e.g. installing waterborne sewerage prior to the construc-
tion of any houses, rather than maintaining a bucket service).
The government's primary concern, on the other hand, was
to take control of the situation throughout the country
as rapidly as possible and, given the financial limits im-
posed on it by the Treasury and the fact that the question
of the levy on employers had not yet been resolved, at mini-
mum cost. The negotiations broke down and towards the end
of 1951, a spokesman for the City Council announced:
At the moment it is the City Council's policy
that no more money will be spent on sub-
economic housing schemes while the question of
what form economic housing schemes will take
is still being discussed.162
(A threat which, in view of the government's clamp down
on sub-economic schemes and the Council's reluctance to
initiate them, rebounded really only to the detriment
of the city's African population.)
The second development was the decision by the Secretary
of Native Affairs in November 1951 that the substantial sub-
sidy paid by the state against the losses incurred by the
Council in maintaining the Moroka Emergency Camp - which had
amounted to some £75 000 a year - would not be renewed when
the five-year period agreed in the negotiations at the time
of the camp's establishment came to an end in April 1952.163
It is possible that the threat that the subsidy would be
withdrawn was intended to introduce a sense of urgency into
the Council's apparently reluctant efforts to comply with
government policy in relation to the Vukuzenzele scheme.1611
Certainly, it seems to have influenced the Council's sudden
decision to undertake the "large-scale Native housing pro-
gramme" which was to rehouse, amongst others, the 11 500
families living in the Emergency Camp. But perhaps it did
not do so quite in the direction that the government would
have chosen, given that it was now becomingly increasingly
sure that the 'site and service' approach represented the only
feasible way of resolving the crisis.
In the event, however, amidst growing acrimony over its
"dismal failure" to get on with the job of actually building
houses, the Council had already decided to proceed with a
proposal to build 1 000 houses in Orlando West and a further
500 "intended for resale under the home-ownership scheme"
in Dube. By the end of June 1953, more than 700 of the
Orlando West houses had been completed and occupied and a
start had been made on the Dube scheme; in addition, plans
for further schemes in Orlando West, Mofolo and Dube, invol-
ving a total of some 5 700 houses had been prepared.165
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With a regular if still limited allocation from the
National Housing Fund now apparently secured as the
general financial situation improved, and under pressure
from its 'rebel' members, the Council had decided in late
1952 to appoint a Director of Housing who was to be responsi-
ble for "the whole of the Council's housing activities (ex-
cluding the management of completed schemes)".166 In May
1953, A.J. Archibald - the former Town Engineer of Springs
and a leading figure in the successful Kwa-Thema experiment
- took up the post and by December, apparently in the face
of considerable opposition from within the Council apparatus
a start had been made with the building of houses by a depa-
rtmental direct labour team using African building artisans
organized on a 'task' basis.167 By the end of January,
Archibald was able to announce that 'Native workers' were
completing eight houses a day at Dube. He added:
Public opinion is changing. It is no longer
true that one half of the city does not know
how the other half lives and does not care.
The Press and those who have kept pegging
away at the need for more Native houses have
brought about the change. With financial
assistance from the National Housing and
Planning Commission and the Native services
levy there is nothing to stop the City Council
from building all the houses needed.1
But even with production figures rising to 16 or more
houses a day and costs reduced to almost half their imme-
diate post-war levels, 1 G 9 the crisis was still not being
resolved "as economically and speedily as possible" and the
policy-makers of the Department of Native Affairs were grow-
ing progressively less tolerant of the failure of the local
authorities to provide the "adequate shelter in properly
planned townships" which would enable "full control over
urban Natives" to be regained.170 As a senior official of
the Department was to note in 1955, despite the fact that
with the establishment of the Native Services Levy Fund, loans
from the National Housing Fund could be "devoted exclusively
to the provision of services and housing within the demarca-
ted location areas",
. . . the rapid commercial and industrial
expansion which took place during the last
two decades and which resulted in the unpre-
cedented influx of workers to urban and neri-
urban areas, left local authorities still in
the position that they were unable to keep pace
with the provision of sufficient austere housing
of approved standards for the ever-increasing
urban Bantu population.171
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In April 1954, Verwoerd moved decisively: in an
interview with a deputation from the City Council "arranged
to discuss the provision of housing loan funds for the
Mofolo Scheme", as a letter from the Secretary of Native
Affairs later confirmed, the .Minister had indicated that:
.... from now onwards housing funds should
be primarily devoted to the acquisition of
land for site~and "service" sch e me s ~ fwh i c h
are home ownership schemes in embryo) and
that money for actual houses should be granted
only for dwellings within site and service
schemes where such schemes are essential to
solve the native accommodation problem with
any degree of rapidity. If this principle
were accepted and evidence of its implementation
were forthcoming he would even be prepared to
ask for special funds for the purchase of the
land, leaving the normal housing funds for the
building of the houses in the schemes.
Consequently, the letter added:
.... further consideration of the Mofolo
scheme must of necessity await your Council's
reactions to the Minister's requirements.172
After consideration of the matter, the Council's Special
Housing Committee suggested in June 1954 that "the Council
should be prepared and indeed anxious to cooperate with the
Minister subject to certain modifications, safeguards and
assurances". It argued, however, that:
In the highest form a site and service scheme
can be compared with a complete development
scheme of an approved estate or township layout.
In such a scheme, all services usual in a fully
built-up township are provided and completed
before a single building is erected.
As against this, the "very austere type of project" proposed
by the Minister had "certain important disadvantages", essen-
tially that the provision and maintenance of temporary ser-
vices - even on the extremely basic level indicated by
Verwoerd - would in the long term prove to be a false economy
in relation to the immediate provision of permanent services.
As a compromise, the Committee suggested that "the Council
should urge the Minister" to accept a scheme "which has a
basis the provision of permanent services at least to the
extent and on the scale of those provided at present to the
housing projects". On this basis, it was proposed "to
proceed with the installation of services for 30 000 sites
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approximately over a period of 41 years, funds to be
supplied from the Native Services Levy and Housing
Funds."173
The Minister, however, was not to be deflected from
the approach to which he was committed, and the 'augmented'
site and service scheme proposed by the Committee was rejec-
ted. "Stalemate",the Institute of Race Relations noted
in its annual Survey, "was, therefore, reached."x7k It
broke, finally, in December 1954 when the Council realised
that, on this point, the Ministerial mountain was not to
be moved. As the report of the Non-European Affairs and
Housing Committee tabled at the last Council meeting of
the year noted:
It has become apparent that until work is
actually commenced on the site an^ services
schemes, no further money for housing will
be received from the Government. Because
of this, it is considered that a start should
be made as soon as possible with the provision
of rudimentary services in the areas of Northern
Moroko (424 stands) and Central Western Jabavu
(855 stands) on a site and service basis, the
money for these services to be applied for as
a grant from Native Services Levy Funds.175
It was, in the words of Patrick Lewis, "the breakthrough"
1 7 6
 By the end of June 1956, 5 481 families comprising some
28 800 people had been settled in the new. schemes and rough-
ly 1 500 houses had been provided for them by Archibald's
Housing Division. The provision of the serviced site had
made it possible to start with the clearance of the squatter
camps at Albertynsville and the Nancefield Brickyards,177
and over the next five years the Council was to systema-
tically lay out and service the remainder of the 35 000 sites
it required to rehouse its squatters, its sub-tenants, and
its 'slum dwellers'. During the first weeks of 1962, the
Manager of the NEAD noted in his report for the period 1960-
1963, "the few remaining shacks which had for so long been
a feature of the Council's housing projects disappeared".178
For Johannesburg - at least for the moment - the African
housing crisis had been resolved.
CONCLUSION
Despite its length, the account which has been presented
here remains, at best, schematic. It is clear that_ the real
complexity_=pf_JJrie .orjLgjLns._and. develogment]"of AfFlcan housing
policy and of its implementation in Johannesburg between
1944 and 1954 cannot be grasped quite as simply as the struc-
ture of the paper may have suggested. It is furthermore,
evident that to endeavour to draw detailed and systematic
theoretical conclusions from a paper of this nature would be
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an inappropriate, and probably premature exercise. However,
beyond the omissions and over-simplifications which any attem-
pt at more rigorous analysis will have to confront, it may
be useful to briefly point to certain more general theore-
tical implications of the short but undoubtedly significant
historical episode which we have examined.
Perhaps what emerges most forcibly from the account
is support for the problematic concept of the 'relative
autonomy1 of the state apparatus in capitalist social for-
mations, an autonomy which nevertheless remains determined
1
 in the last instance' by the 'economic'. In the Nationalist
government-1 S yof n ^ ^ 1 i-p ptncf^pi- f-hg> ' i TIPVI fah i, 1 j ,f.y_'_ of t.he _
1
 natural' economic procej5_se_s^ wjii.ch had resulted in the mas-
sive influx of Africans to the major urban areas during the
war, and in the real measures it took to halt and if possible
reverse this flow, it is apparent that it was exercising a
political (and ideological) power in opposition to the stra-
tegic intentions of at least that fraction of the dominant
class under whose hegemony the Fagan Report had been produced
and the ideas of the Social and Economic Planning Council
had gained considerable currency. The limits of this auto-
nomy, on the other hand, were equally clearly drawn in the
Nationalists' 'pragmatic' acceptance of the fact that it
would nevertheless continue to be necessary to accommodate
an urban African labour force in the 'white' cities, "for
many years".
At a less programmatic level, the same relationship
between state and capital can be observed in the way in
which the Nationalist government carried out the interven-
tionist role imposed on it by the need to secure the repro-
duction of this labour force. The implicit political
threat posed by the autonomous squatter movement was met,
not by their expulsion using the brutally repressive means
which were to be employed in other spheres, but with the
realisation that it could, in fact, be brought under control
by the provision of "adequate shelter in properly planned
Native townships" - which, of course, amounted to a tacit
recognition of the 'legitimacy' of the squatters' presence
in the urban areas. But, within this acceptance of the
'economic realities', the question of how the social costs
of the 'solution' to the reproduction crisis were to be
distributed was resolved politically , and at the expense
of the dominant social class. Given the history of the pro-
longed and intense three-cornered conflict between the
central government, the local authorities and the represen-
tatives of organized commerce and industry that preceded the
passage of the Native Services Levy Act, it may be argued
that the initial selective application of the levy (only in
the major urban areas) represented an attempt_bY the Nation-
alists , to _j[orce the intervervblQ^ist r.ole.. imp.asjk& on .thenuby
the_±£_ access-ion. to_state power, at least partially into the
mould of apartheid policy. For, in effect, the levy was
intended to apply an 'economic' constraint to the substi-
tution of white workers by less 'skilled' Africans which
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those employers who had been the most vocal proponents of
the need to 'stabilize' the African labour force were still
struggling to achieve.
As against the 'relative autonomy' which the Nationa-
list government appears to have asserted in certain spheres,
however, we must place the internal conflicts and contra-
dictions of a state apparatus that in no way corresponds
to the image of a monolithic unity and coherence with which
it has sometimes been invested. This fragmentation is, of
course, particularly obvious in the division between the
local authorities and the central government, but what the
analysis above suggests quite strongly is that the conflict
is actually rooted in the different political and social
matrices in which the two levels of the state apparatus are
located. In this respect, I have hypothesized that the
fierce resistance of the Johannesburg City Council to the
idea that it was to be primarily responsible for accommoda-
ting its African population was due to its domination by the
representatives of an 'urban bourgeoisie1 with interests
quite different from those of the strata or 'fractions1 of
the bourgeoisie dominant at the national level, which were
not - at least for capital operating on a monopoly basis -
as tightly tied to 'urban'processes in specific localities.
This, however, remains an area in which a great deal
more work is required and one promising direction of enquiry
might be to examine the rather different attitude towards the
African housing problem adopted by local authorities in towns
such as Witbank and Springs, where it seems possible that the
location -bound nature of heavy industry had induced the repre-
sentatives of 'big' capital to take rather more interest in
local affairs. The other area of investigation which could .
well throw more light on this question is the matter of the
Western Areas removals in Johannesburg, to which only passing
reference was made in the paper to avoid extending it to an
even more excessive length. An analysis of the configuration
of interests which induced the City Council to initiate the
removal proposal in 1944 and, for a period, to collaborate
with the Nationalist government in setting up the 'Ad Hoc'
Committee to oversee its implementation would, I think, tell
us much about the nature of the dominant social class at the
local level. Indeed, such an analysis could be usefully ex-
tended to examine the very different responses of the various
local authorities to the implementation of the Group Areas
legislation during the 50s, which in its 'dysfunctional'
effects - massive social disruption, increased costs of repro-
duction and additional state expenditure to rehouse the affec-
ted people - remains difficult to explain in terms of a mater-
ialist theory of the state. A starting point for the analysis
in relation to Johannesburg might be to investigate the possi-
bility of an objective alliance of interest between the 'urban
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bourgeoisie1 and the local representatives of the white
petty bourgeoisie and working class anxious to secure access
to conveniently - located residential land and/or trading
catchments.
Finally, beyond these questions of what has come to be
known as 'urban politics' and present in this paper really
only as a sort of background against which they are played
out, lies the struggle of the African masses to survive
in the hostile environment of the 'white' cities. In a
sense, the next objective in the long-term project of which
this paper represents only the first step is to reverse the
order of its analysis and, with the evolution of 'township
policy' pushed essentially into the background, to begin
to unravel the tangled skein which is the history of popular
struggle in this period and beyond. It is a major task but,
hopefully without reverting to the spatial determinism
which so befogs, for instance, the 'analysis' offered by
bodies such as the Urban Foundation, it will eventually be
possible to show how the 'resolution' of the African
housing crisis of thirty years ago ultimately failed to
resolve the real contradictions in South African society
and succeeded only in establishing one of the arenas in
which, today, they are once again being fought out.
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